Measure 37\u27s Federal Law Exception: A Critical Protection for Oregon\u27s Federally Approved Land Use Laws by Puskas, Rebecca L
Boston College Law Review
Volume 48
Issue 5 Number 5 Article 4
11-1-2007
Measure 37's Federal Law Exception: A Critical
Protection for Oregon's Federally Approved Land
Use Laws
Rebecca L. Puskas
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Land Use Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rebecca L. Puskas, Measure 37's Federal Law Exception: A Critical Protection for Oregon's Federally Approved Land Use Laws, 48 B.C.L.
Rev. 1301 (2007), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol48/iss5/4
MEASURE 37'S FEDERAL LAW EXCEPTION:
A CRITICAL PROTECTION FOR OREGON'S
FEDERALLY APPROVED LAND USE LAWS
Abstract: Ballot Measure 37, a property rights initiative passed by Oregon
voters in November 2004, rpequires Oregon's state and local governments
to compensate landowners for any reduction in the value of real property
due to land use regulation or else to waive the offending regulations. This
Note addresses the scope of an important exception to Measure 37: the
law does not apply "to the extent that the land use regulation is required
to comply with federal law." The ambit of this exception is questionable
because many federal environmental laws, some with significant land use
implications, involve a partnership approach called cooperative federal-
ism where federal agencies set broad goals and states are responsible for
on-the-ground implementation. This Note surveys Measure 37's federal
law exception in its textual, regulatory, and constitutional contexts and
concludes that the most tenable interpretation is a broad one: Measure
37 does not apply to land use regulations in federally approved plans and
programs that represent Oregon's efforts to comply with federal law. This
interpretation is reinforced by a clarifying definition of "federal law" in
Ballot Measure 49, an initiative subject to a November 2007 special elec-
tion vote.
INTRODUCTION
In November 2004, Oregon voters passed ballot Measure 37, a law
demanding that "government must pay landowners when certain land
use regulations reduce land values."' In sum, Measure 37 requires pay-
ment for lost value of real property due to land use regulations enacted
after the owner or a family member acquired the property. 2 In lieu of
payment, state and local governments may waive the regulations at is-
sue.3 Measure 37 represents a dramatic departure from both state and
I Compensation for Loss of Value Due to Land Use Regulation, OR. REV. STAT.
§ 197.352 (2005) (commonly referred to as Measure 37); Btu. BRADBURY, OR. SEC'Y OF
STATE, OFFICIAL 2004 GENERAL ELECTION VOTERS' PAMPHLET 103 (2004).
2 See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352 (1), (3) (E).
3 Id. § 197.352(8).
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1302	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 48:1301
federal regulatory takings law. 4 Rather than focusing on the remaining
value of regulated property as courts have done for decades, Measure
37 grants relief based on the value lost due to regulation.° Notably,
Measure 37's impact extends beyond Oregon's borders.° Encouraged
by Measure 37's success at the ballot box, property rights advocates
have recently proposed similar initiatives in nine other states.? Al-
though many of these efforts have failed, in November 2006 Arizona
voters passed a law virtually identical to Oregon's Measure 37.8
Measure 37 has generated thousands of claims worth billions of
dollars.8 The Measure does not provide a source of funding to compen-
sate successful claimants and thus state and local governments have
been forced to waive many of Oregon's land use laws. 1 ° Measure 37
proponents assert that these waivers represent much-needed relief
from the state's restrictive land use planning system." On the other
hand, the law weakens the state's ability to enforce land use regulations
that promote important public values and stymies future land use
planning efforts."
4 See id. § 197.352; Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978); Dodd v. Hood River County,
855 P.24 608, 613 (Or. 1993).
See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631; Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130-
31; Dodd, 855 P.2d at 613.
6 See Regulatory Takings Ballot Measures Across America: Attack of the Measure 37 Clones, AM.
PLANNING ASSN, Dec. 6, 2006, http://www.planning.org/legislation/measure37/  [herein-
after Ballot Measures Across America]. See generally Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Measure 37
and a Spoonful of Kelo: A Recipe for Property Rights Activists at the Ballot Box, 38 URB. LAW.
1065 (2006).
7 Ballot Measures Across America, supra note 6.
JANICE K. BREWER, ARIZ. SEC'Y OF STATE, BALLOT PROPOSITIONS & JUDICIAL PER-
FORMANCE REVIEW 177-92 (2006) [hereinafter BREWER, BALLOT PROPOSrTIONS]; JANICE K.
BREWER, ARIZ. SEC'Y OF STATE, STATE OF ARIZONA OFFICIAL CANVAS 16 (2006) [hereinaf-
ter BREWER, OFFICIAL CANVAS]; Ballot Measures Across America, supra note 6.
See OR. DEP'T OF LAND CONSERVATION AND DEV., SUMMARIES OF CLAIMS FILED IN THE
STATE (2007), http://www.lccLstate.or.us/LCD/MEASURE37/stutunaries  of claims.shtmlitSum-
marks of Claims_Filed_in_the_State [hereinafter DLCD SUMMARIES OF CLAIMS FILED].
1° See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352 (2005); OR, DEP'T OF ADMIN. SERVS., MEASURE 37
CLAIMS REGISTRY (2007) [hereinafter DAS CLAIMS REGISTRY], available at http://www.
oregon.gov/DAS/SSD/ Risk/M37Registry.sh tml.
11 See Steven G. Gieseler et al., Measure 37: Paying People for What We Take, 36 ENV11.. L.
79, 90 (2006); David J. Hunnicutt, Oregon Land-Use Regulation and Ballot Measure 37: New-
ton's Third Law at Work, 36 ENVTL. L. 25, 26-27 (2006).
Is
	
Margaret H. Clune, Government Hardly Could Go On: Oregon's Measure 37, Implica-
tions for Land Use Planning and a More Rational Means of Compensation, 38 URB. LAW. 275,
286 (2006); Edward J. Sullivan, Year Zero: The Aftermath of Measure 37, 36 ENVTL. L. 131, 156
(2006).
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Measure 37 has been incredibly controversial and many Orego-
nians who voted for its passage in 2004 have since realized that its ef-
fects go substantially beyond what they intended." Numerous rural
landowners have been confronted with neighbors' attempts to build
subdivisions in the midst of formerly protected farmland or forest-
land." Many more Oregonians, regardless of where they call home,
are disturbed by the dramatic change in the state's landscape threat-
ened by Measure 37 waivers." In a November 2007 special election,
. Oregon citizens will have an opportunity to refine Measure 37. 16 Bal-
lot Measure 49, referred to the Oregon voters by the state legislature,
limits the extent of Measure 37 waivers and protects high-value farm-
land, foresdand, and places with limited water supplies. 17 •
Importantly, Measure 37 contains several exceptions that render
certain types of land use regulations beyond the reach of would-be
claimants." One critical exception—the focus of this Note's analysis—
declares that Measure 37 does not apply "to the extent that the land
use regulation is required to comply with federal law. " 19 The scope of
this federal law exception is potentially subject to extremely narrow,
or relatively broad, interpretations." More specifically, most federal
laws with land use implications, including many major environmental
18 Memorandum from David Metz, Fairbank, Maslin, Maullin & Associates, to Opportu-
nity PAC II (Mar. 16, 2007) [hereinafter Metz Memorandum], available at http://govern-
ocoregon.gov/Gov/dor_s/ICeyFindingsOregonStatewideVoterSurvey.pdf;  Yes on 49, Oregon
Stories, http://www.yeson49.com/2007/07/oregon_stories.html  (last visited July 29, 2007).
14 See Yes on 49, supra note 13.
16 See Metz Memorandum, supra note 13 (voter survey concluding that more than two-
thirds of voters either want to fix what they see as significant flaws in Measure 37 or believe
that it should be repealed entirely"); Yes on 49, Measure 49: Our one chance to protect
what's special about Oregon, http://www.yeson49.com/2007/07/a_special_messa.html
(last visited Sept. 20, 2007) (online letter signed by nine prominent Oregonians including
current Governor Ted Kulongoski and three former Governors).
16 BILL BRADBURY, OR. SEC'Y OF STATE, NOVEMBER 6, 2007, SPECIAL ELECTION, MEAS-
URE 49, EXPLANATORY STATEMENT [hereinafter MEASURE 49 EXPLANATORY STATEMENT],
available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov62007 (last visited Sept. 21, 2007);
BILL BRADBURY, OR. SEC'Y or STATE, NOVEMBER 6, 2007, SPECIAL ELECTION, MEASURE 49,
BALLOT TITLE [hereinafter MEASURE 49 BALLOT TITLE], available at http://wwwsos.state.
orus/elections/nov62007 (last visited Sept. 21, 2007).
17 MEASURE 49 EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, supra note 16. This is a much-simplified
summary of Measure 49. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text for a more detailed
explanation.
18 OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3) (2005) .
19 Id. § 197.352 (3) (C) .
29 See id.; Columbia River Gorge Comm'n v. Hood River County, 152 P.3d 997, 1004
(Or. Ct. App. 2007), review denied, 160 P.3d 992 (Or. 2007); Hunnicutt, supra note 11, at 43;
Caroline E.K. MacLaren, Oregon at a Crossroads: Where Do We Go from Herd, 36 ENvTL. L. 53,
65-66 (2006); Sullivan, supra note 12, at 145.
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statutes, operate by delegating regulatory authority to state and local
governments—a model called cooperative federalism. 21 It is unclear
whether Measure 37 applies to those state and local land use regula-
tions that form part of federal frameworks. 22
This Note explores the scope of Measure 37's federal law excep-
tion in its textual, regulatory, and constitutional contexts. 28 It argues
that a broad interpretation of Measure 37's federal law exception is
more tenable than a narrow one. 24 The federal law exception exempts
not only state and local regulations explicitly mandated by federal law
but also regulations necessary to achieve the benchmarks of more
flexible cooperative federalism statutes. 25 This conclusion is explicitly
reinforced • by the text of Ballot Measure 49, which defines "federal
law" to include land use regulations passed under authority delegated
from the federal government.20
Part I of this Note provides a brief history of Measure 37 and de-
scribes some of the divergent views about its effects. 27 It then explains
that Measure 37 is a statute in flux and may be tempered by Ballot
Measure 49.28 Among many improvements intended to reflect the sen-
timent of Oregonians concerned both about their property rights and
the long-term livability of their state, Ballot Measure 49 clarifies the fed-
eral law issue in a way that could be an important determinant of
Measure 37's ultimate impact. 28 Part II reviews the methods Congress
has used to require compliance with federal law and considers their
constitutional limits." Next, it describes cooperative federalism as a
pervasive approach in modern environmental law and introduces two
cooperative federalism statutes that have significant land use implica-
21 See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981); Zvo-
NruNT .J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY
305 (2004); Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.V.U.
EN VTL. L.J. 179, 183-84 (2005).
22 See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3)(C); see, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-
1387 (West 2001 & Supp. 2007). But see Columbia, 152 P.3d at 1004 (holding that Measure
37 does not apply to land use regulations passed to comply with the Columbia River Gorge
National Scenic Area Act); see infra notes 178-191 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 35-314 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 191-313 and accompanying text.
22 See id.
" BILL BRADBURY, NOVEMBER 6, 2007, SPECIAL ELECTION, MEASURE 49, TEXT OF MEAS-
URE, [hereinafter MEASURE 49 nata], available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/
nov62007 (last visited Sept. 21, 2007); see infra notes 89-90, 192-314 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 38-68 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 94-123 and accompanying text.
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tions: the Clean Water Act and the Columbia River Gorge National
Scenic Area Act." Lastly, it reviews the February 2006 decision by the
Oregon Court of Appeals, Columbia River Gorge Commission TA Hood River
County, which holds that Measure 37 does not apply to county land use
regulations adopted pursuant to the Scenic Area Act. 32 Part III argues
for a broad interpretation of Measure 37's federal law exception that
would extend the Columbia holding to include all land use regulations
in federally approved plans and programs that represent Oregon's ef-
forts to comply with federal law." Such a broad interpretation is sup-
ported by the text of the exception itself, constitutional principles of
federalism, key elements of federal statutes, and the practical conse-
quences of an alternative narrow interpretation."
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEASURE 37
This Part provides a brief background on Measure 37 and presents
some of the conflicting views about the law's potential impacts." It then
describes the dynamic context in which Measure 37 is currently being
interpreted, including the proposal of Ballot Measure 49. 36 This infor-
mation serves as a backdrop for analyzing the scope of Measure 37's
federal law exception, a provision that could have significant implica-
tions for Oregon's landscape."
A. Measure 37: Reprieve from Oregon's Regulatory Nightmare
or Land Use Sclerosis? 38
The poster child of the Measure 37 campaign was Dorothy Eng-
lish, a ninety-four year old widow and the owner of a large tract of for-
31 See infra notes 124-177 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 178-191 and accompanying text,
99 See infra notes 192-314 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 192-314 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 38-68 and accompanying text.
53 See infra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
99 This subtitle reflects the opposing views of two authors who have weighed in on the
Measure 37 debate. See Gieseler et al., supra note 11, at 91; Sullivan, supra note 12, at 131,
156. In their article, Measure 37: Paying People for What We Take, Steven G. Gieseler, Staff
Attorney at the Pacific Legal Foundation, and his coauthors labeled Oregon's land use
planning system prior to Measure 37 a "regulatory nightmare.' Gieseler et al., supra note
11, at 91. On the other hand, in his article, Year Zero: The Aftermath of Measure 37, Edward J.
Sullivan predicted that Measure 37 would cause a "sclerosis of the state's land use planning
system." Sullivan, supra note 12, at 131,156.
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est land in Multnomah County, outside the city of Portland. 39 When
Mrs. English purchased her property in 1953, she intended to someday
divide the land, selling a portion to provide retirement income and giv-
ing the remainder to her children. 40 As the television ads leading up to
the November 2004 elections complained, land use regulations prohib-
iting subdivision, imposed by the County starting in the early 1970s to
meet visionary state goals such as forest protection and the contain-
ment of urbanization, now stood between Mrs. English and her desire
to distribute her property near the end of her life. 41
Largely in response to such concerns about the perceived unfair-
ness of Oregon's land use laws, voters passed Ballot. Measure 37 in No-
vember 2004 with sixty-one percent of the electorate voting in favor of
the new law. 42 Measure 37 requires state and local governments to ei-
ther pay landowners for lost value due to the regulation of their prop-
erty or to waive the contested regulations. 43 Under the Measure, land-
ss
	 et al., supra note 11, at 94.
4° Id.
41 Clune, supra note 12, at 295; Gieseler et al., supra note 11, at 93-94. The campaign
to adopt Measure 37 was spearheaded by Oregonians in Action, the nation's largest prop-
erty rights group, and financed in large part by natural resource extraction interests and
developers. See Clune, supra note 12, at 292; Randi Bjornstad, Campaign Donors File Big
Claims Under Law, REG.-GUARD (Eugene, Or,), Sept, 3, 2006, at Al. Portraying Mrs. English
as a victim of government regulation to generate support for Measure 37 is a strategy em-
ployed frequently by the modern property rights movement. See Christine A. Klein, The
New Nuisance: An Antidote to Wetland Loss, Sprawl, and Global Warming, 48 B.C. L. ItEv. 1155,
1163-65 (2007). Planning advocates and conservation groups lined up in opposition to
the Measure, resulting in a highly publicized and well-financed campaign on both sides. See
Hunnicutt, supra note 11, at 41.
42 Or. Dep't of Land Conservation and Dev, Measure 37 Legal Information About the
Election, hup://www.oregon.gov/LCD/MEASURE37/legal_information.shunl (last visited
Sept. 21, 2007) [hereinafter DCLD Information About the Election]; see Clune, supra note
12, at 284.
42 OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352 (2005). The text of Measure 37 provides:
If a public entity enacts of enforces a new land use regulation or enforces a
land use regulation enacted prior to the effective date of this statute] that
restricts the use of private real property or any interest therein and has the ef-
fect of reducing the fair market value of the property, or any interest therein,
then the owner of the property shall be paid just compensation.
Id. § 197.352(I). Measure 37's waiver provision reads:
[I]n lieu of payment of just compensation under this section, the governing
body responsible for enacting the land use regulation may modify, remove, or
not apply the land use regulation or land use regulations to allow the owner
to use the property for a use permitted at the time the owner acquired the
property.
Id. § 197.352(8).
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owners have a valid claim for "just compensation" or waiver if they can
show that: 1) a land use regulation was enacted or changed after the
owner or a family member acquired the land, 2) the regulation restricts
use of the land, and 3) the regulation reduces the value of the prop-
erty." After December 4, 2006, claimants seeking to contest existing
regulations must also provide evidence that they have filed a land use
application and that the application has been denied or conditioned as
a result of the contested land use regulation.* Government bodies re-
ceiving Measure 37 claims have 180 days to award payment or issue 'a
waiver; if no action is taken, the landowner has a cause of action in a
state trial court and can recover damages as well as attorney's fees and
other costs."
One view is that Measure 37 addresses inequities created by Ore-
gon's statewide land use planning system.° Proponents claim that
Measure 37 is an improvement upon fuzzy and unforgiving regulatory
takings law and provides a much needed remedy for the many rural
landowners who feel disenfranchised because their properties have
been devalued by restrictive land use regulations.*
Measure 37 provides a direct answer to concerns about the re-
strictiveness of Oregon's land use laws and a strict standard for award-
ing compensation, but what are its costs? 49 Oregon voters have begun
to realize that Measure 37 not only provides relief for landowners
"Id. § 197.352(1), (3)(E).
45 Id. § 197.352(5); Or. Dep't of Admin. Servs., Risk Management, Measure 37, http://
www.das.state.or.us/DAS/SSD/Risk/M37Clairn.s.shunl (last visited Sept 21, 2007).
" OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(4), (6).
47 See Hunnicutt, supra note 11, at 27. Oregon's statewide land use planning system re-
quires every city and county to adopt a comprehensive land use plan consistent with nine-
teen Statewide Planning Goals. OR. ADMIN. R. 660-015-0000(1) to -0010(4) (2007), avail-
able at http://www.lcd.state.or.us/LCD/goals.shtml; Sullivan, supra note 12, at 135. The
Statewide Planning Goals and their companion regulations emphasize forest and farmland
protection; management of coastal resources; and controlling urban development, in par-
ticular through the use of urban growth boundaries. See OR. ADMIN. R. 660-015-0000(1) to
-0010(4). Oregon's system has been heralded as the country's leading land use program
and until recent years, it has also enjoyed consistent support from Oregon citizens at the
ballot box. See Clune, supra note 12, at 293; Sullivan, supra note 12, at 134.
48 See Hunnicutt, supra note 11, at 34-37; Gieseler et al., supra note 11, at 88-90. Steven
Gieseler, Staff Attorney at the Pacific Legal Foundation writes: "EvJague standards, subjec-
tive balancing of interests, and an almost perfect record of judgments denying compensa-
tion suggest that Penn Central does not offer meaningful or reliable constitutional protec-
tion for property owners." Gieseler et al., supra note 11, at 88. He further suggests that with
Measure 37 and similar proposals in other states, "American citizens are . . . putting an end
to a regulatory takings regime that has gone too far." Id. at 104.
49 See OR. REV. STAT, § 197.352; supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text; infra notes
50-68 and accompanying text.
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such as Dorothy English, but that it is likely to have a dramatic effect
on land use across the state. 50 As of May 25, 2007, the state had re-
ceived over 6749 Measure 37 claims totaling over $19 billion (not to
mention the many claims Oregon's counties and local governments
received). 51 Many Measure 37 claims have come not from individual
landowners but from developers and extractive industries seeking to
maximize their profits. 52 One extreme example is a $203 million de-
mand that James R. Miller filed in Dechutes County." In 2000 Mr.
Miller's 157 acre property became part of the Newberry National Vol-
canic Monument, an area in Central Oregon covering more than fifty
thousand acres and comprised of lakes, lava flows, and spectacular
geologic features. 54 Mr. Miller—who has owned the land since 1969—
sought the right to develop a large pumice mine, geothermal power
plant, and 100 vacation homes near one of the two lakes within the
Monument.55 Claims with such "monumental" implications were not
something most Oregonians expected when they voted for Measure
37.56 In fact, recent surveys show that the majority of Oregon voters
either want to fix what they see as significant flaws in Measure 37 or
believe that it should be repealed entirely. 57
5° See MacLaren, supra note 20, at 58; Sullivan, supra note 12, at 162.
51 DLCD SUMMARIES OF CLAIMS FILED, supra note 9.
52 See Bjornstad, supra note 41.
55 Editorial, Judge's Ruling Limits the Bonanza from Measure 37, OREGONIAN, Aug. 14,
2006, at B6 [hereinafter OREGONIAN Editorial].
" Id.; USDA Forest Serv., Newberry Crater National Volcanic Monument, http://www.
fs.fed.us/r6/centraloregon/newberrynym/index.shtml  (last visited Sept. 21, 2007).
55 OREGONIAN Editorial, supra note 53.
56 See Clune, supra note 12, at 292, 296; OREGONIAN Editorial, supra note 53. Propo-
nents assert that Measure 37 captured voter opposition to the restrictiveness of the state
land use planning system. Hunnicutt, supra note 11, at 37, 39. Others have suggested that
there was a certain degree of "special interest capture" involved; the Measure's success was
attributable to the ability of Oregonians in Action and other property rights advocates to
dominate media attention and political debate. Clune, supra note 12, at 296.
57 Metz Memorandum, supra note 13 (voter survey concluding that "more than two-
thirds of voters either want to fix what they see as significant flaws in Measure 37 or believe
that it should be repealed entirely"). Many Oregonians who voted for the Measure may not
have viewed it as a challenge to the land use planning system, and "smart growth" princi-
ples they had long upheld. Clune, supra note 12, at 292, 296. An April 2005, poll captures
the complexity of voter sentiment. See id. at 292; Laura Oppenheimer & James Mayer, Poll:
Balance Rights, Land Use, OREGONIAN, Apr. 21, 2005, at Cl ("On one hand, respondents
valued protecting private property rights more than protecting farmland, the environ-
ment, or wildlife habitat .... On the other hand, more than two thirds said growth man-
agement makes Oregon a more desirable place to live.").
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Another concern is Measure 37's frustration of land use regula-
tions already in place and its chilling effect on future regulation.° State
and local governments faced with a flood of claims and without budgets
to fmance compensation have invariably exercised their option to waive
land use regulations rather than pay compensation. 59 While Mr. Miller's
claim ultimately proved unsuccessful, many more claims with similarly
ambitious development plans—often located in hitherto protected
farm and forestland—have received Measure 37 waivers.° The result is
a patchwork of regulation where successful claimants can ignore rules
that still apply to their neighbors. 61 Longer-lasting damage may result
from the unwillingness of state or local governments to adopt regula-
tions that provide important public benefits because they might be the
target of future Measure 37 claims.° As U,S. SUpreme Court Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes warned in the 1922 landmark case Pennsylvania
Coal u Mahon, "Government hardly could go on if to some extent val-
ues incident to property could not be diminished without paying for
every such change in the general law."69 Finally, Measure 37 has created
an environment of uncertainty with respect to property interests that
has affected individual property owners as well as the real estate, bank-
ing, and legal industries."
It appears that the unraveling of Oregon's much-celebrated land
use planning system has served as a warning to some states contemplat-
ing initiatives styled after Measure 37, yet the pressure from property
rights advocates to adopt similar laws elsewhere continues. 65 Voters in
68 See Clune, supra note 12, at 286-88; MacLaren, supra note 20, at 68-69; Sullivan, su-
pra note 12, at 156-57.
66 See DAS CLAIMS REGISTRY, supra note 10.
6° In re Claim for Compensation Under ORS 197.352, Final Order Claim No. M129449
(2006), available at http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/MEASURE37/docs/fmals2006/M129449_
Miller_Deschutes.pdf (denying Miller's claim); DAS CLAIMS REGISTRY, supra note 10. Port-
land State University has produced maps that provide a striking visual of Measure 37 claims
across the state. See Portland State Univ., Mapping Measure 37 Claims, http://www.pdx.edu/
ims/maps.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2007).
61 See Clune, supra note 12, at 286.
62 See id.; Sullivan, supra note 12, at 156.
63 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
64 See MacLaren, supra note 20, at 67.
66 See Ballot Measures Across America, supra note 6. Many "regulatory takings" initiatives
proposed after Measure 37 have taken advantage of the backlash against the U.S. Supreme
Court's 2005 decision Kelo v. City of New London, holding that an eminent domain taking of
private homes for economic redevelopment where private entities would benefit met the
"public use" requirement of the Fifth Amendment. See 545 U.S. 469, 489-90 (2005); Salkin
& Lavine, supra note 6, at 1069-70. Provisions similar to Measure 37 have been packaged
together with state constitutional amendments or new state statutes that restrict the types
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Washington, Idaho, and California rejected comparable ballot initia-
tives in the November 2006 elections. 66 Arizona voters, however, passed
Proposition 207, labeled the "Private Property Rights Protection Act," a
statute that includes "just compensation" provisions almost identical to
Measure 37.67 Regulatory takings initiatives are likely to resurface in
future elections in at least five other states where Measure 37-type pro-
posals were removed from the November 2006 ballot before election
day, in most cases due to drafting or procedural errors.°
B. A Statute in Flux
Measure 37 went into effect on December 2, 2004, but was chal-
lenged immediately on constitutional grounds. 69 The lead petitioner
was former State Senator Hector MacPherson, a dairy farmer and long-
time advocate for comprehensive land use planning in Oregon." In a
decisive February 2006 opinion, the Supreme Court of Oregon held
that Measure 37 does not violate either the Oregon or the U.S. Consti-
tution.71 Following that decision, Measure 37 claims that had been
of public uses for which eminent domain can be exercised. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 6,
at 1069-70; Ballot Measures Across America, supra note 6.
60 See Ballot Measures Across America, supra note 6.
07 See BREWER, BALLOT PROFOSFTIONS, supra note 8, at 177-92; BREWER, OFFICIAL
CANVAS, supra note 8, at 16; Ballot Measures Across America, supra note 6.
ea See Ballot Measures Across America, supra note 6. Initiatives similar to Measure 37 were
removed from the ballot prior to the November 2006 elections in the following states:
Colorado (withdrawn by the initiative sponsor as part of a political compromise), Missouri
(stricken from the ballot by the Missouri Secretary of State for technical reasons), Mon-
tana (removed from the ballot after the Montana Supreme Court upheld a lower court
ruling that the signature gathering effort was fraudulent), Nevada (regulatory takings
provisions of the ballot measure removed after the Nevada Supreme Court ruled that the
originally submitted ballot language did not comply with state requirements that ballot
measures address only a single issue), and Oklahoma (removed from the ballot after the
Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that the proposed initiative was unconstitutional because
it addressed more than one public policy issue). Id.
69 MacPherson v. Dep't of Admin. Servs., 130 P.3d 308, 312 (Or. 2006); DCLD Infor-
mation About the Election, supra note 42.
70 MacPherson, 130 P.3d at 308; Clune, supra note 12, at 288. The lawsuit was joined by a
number of county farm bureaus; other affected individuals; and 1000 Friends of Oregon, a
prominent state advocacy organization focused on land use issues. MacPherson, 130 P.3d at
308; Clune, supra note 12, at 289.
71 MacPherson, 130 P.3d at 322. Notably, the court held that Measure 37 does not vio-
late separation of powers nor does it impede the plenary power of the state's legislative
bodies to enact land use regulations. Id. at 315, 318. Rather, the court explained, Measure
37 represents an exercise of legislative power by the people of Oregon through a ballot
initiative rather than a limit on legislative power. Id. at 315. The court also explained that
Measure 37 does not violate substantive due process because it advances the rational policy
objective of compensating or otherwise relieving landowners for a diminution in property
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temporarily put on hold once again flooded state and local govern-
ment offices. 72
The Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development
has promulgated administrative rules to govern the process of filing
and reviewing Measure 37 claims, as have many cities and counties."
The state Attorney General and the Governor have issued memoranda
providing clarifications on a number of legal issues, and Oregon's
courts have begun to interpret various provisions of the statute. 74
Most recently, the Oregon state legislature developed a proposal to
amend Measure 37, which has been referred to the voters for a special
election on November 6, 2007." In short, Ballot Measure 49 clarifies
private landowners' rights to build a limited number of homes on prop-
erties that they owned before land use restrictions were imposed; it also
extends those rights to surviving spouses (this transferability is unclear
under Measure 37). 76 At the same time, Measure 49 disallows subdivi
value resulting from certain land use regulations. Id. at 322. The court concluded:
'Whether Measure 37 as a policy choice is wise or foolish, farsighted or blind, is beyond
this court's purview." Id.
72 See DAS CLAIMS REGISTRY, supra note 10; Or. Dep't of Land Conservation and Dev.,
Measure 37 Legal Information, Supreme Court Reinstates Measure 37 (Mar. 9, 2006),
h ttp://www.oregon.gov/LCD/MEASURE37/legal_information.sh  tml.
75 OR, ADMIN. R. 125-145-0010 to -0105 (2007); e.g., Coos COUNTY, OR., CODE
§ 11.040.010—.080 (2005); LANE COUNTY, OR., CODE § 2.700—.770 (2004); MULTNOMAH
COUNTY, OR., ConE § 27.500-365 (2005). Note, however, that in January 2007, the Ore-
gon Court of Appeals in Corey a. Department of Land Conservation Co' Development, held that
the state's administrative rules, which provide only for written comment, do not satisfy
constitutional due process requirements. 152 P.3d 933, 937-38 (Or. Ct. App. 2007),
amended by 159 P.3d 327 (Or. CL App. 2007). One of the objectives of a newly established
Committee on Land Use Fairness in the Oregon senate is to establish uniform procedures
for dealing with Measure 37 claims. Randi Bjornstad, Lawmaker Aims to Solve the Dilemma of
Measure 37, REG:GUARD, Jan. 2, 2007, at Al. These procedures may be further revised
under Measure 49. See MEASURE 49 EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, supra note 16; MEASURE 49
TEXT, supra note 26.
74 Se4 e.g., Memorandum from Theodore R. Kulongoski, Governor of Or., Initial Ques-
tions 8c Answers About Ballot Measure 37 (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://governor. ore-
gon.gov/Gov/pdf/m37qa.pclf;  Letter from Stephanie Striffler, Special Counsel to the Attor-
ney Gen. of Or., to Lane Shetterty, Dir., Or. Dep't of Land Conservation and Dev. (Feb. 24,
2005) [hereinafter Striffler Letter], available at http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/meas-
ure37/m37dojadvice.pdf; Or. Dep't of Justice, Pending Measure 37 Litigation, http://www
doj.state.or.us/hot_topics/measure371itigation.shtml  (last visited Oct.!, 2007) [hereinafter
Pending Measure 37 Litigation].
76 See MEASURE 49 TEXT, supra note 26; Or. Sec'y of State Elections Div., November 6,
2007, Special Election, http://wwwsos.state.or.us/elections/nov62007/  (last visited Sept.
7, 2007),
76 Jackson County v. All Electors, No. 05-2993-E-3(2), slip op. at 9 (Or. Cir. Ct. Jackson
Co. Jan. 19, 2007) (finding that Measure 37 claims are not transferable); MEASURE 49 Ex-
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sions on high-value farmland, forestland and groundwater-restricted
land and bars claims for strip malls, mines and other commercial and
industrial development. 77 The primary goal of these changes is to make
the law more consistent with the true intent of Oregon voters who
passed Measure 37 in 2004.78
C. Measure 37's Federal Law Exception and Measure 49's Fix
One of the many open legal questions presented by Measure 37 is
the full scope of the statute's federal law exception." The federal law
exception provides that Measure 37 does not apply "to the extent that
the land use regulation is required to comply with federal law." 8°
Property rights advocates have advanced the view that the federal
law exception should include only those state and local land use laws
explicitly mandated by federal law. 81 Such an interpretation would
exempt very few, if any, land use regulations from Measure 37 because
most federal laws implicating land use employ a more flexible federal-
state partnership approach, which the U.S. Supreme Court has de-
scribed as cooperative federalism. 82
For example, under the Clean Water Act (the "CWA"), Oregon has
established specific water pollution standards called Total Maximum
PLANATORY STATEMENT, supra note 16; MEASURE 49 TEXT, supra note 26. See generallyiona
Maukonen, Transferring Measure 37 Waivers, 36 ENYT. L. 177 (2007).
" MEASURE 49 EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, supra note 16; IvIr.AsuRe 49 TEXT, supra note
26.
78 13jornstad, supra note 73; Yes on 49, http://yeson49.com  (last visited July, 29, 2007).
7 See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3) (C) (2005); Columbia River Gorge Comm'n v. Hood
River County, 152 P.3d 997, 1004 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that Measure 37 does not
apply to land use regulations adopted to comply with the Columbia River Gorge National
Scenic Area Act), review denied, 160 P.3d 992 (Or. 2007).
88 OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3)(C). Measure 37 has other important exceptions. Id.
§ 197.352(3). The law does not apply to regulations that restrict activities historically rec-
ognized as public nuisances, regulations for the protection of public health and safety such
as fire and building codes, or regulations restricting the use of a property for the purpose
of pornography or performing nude dancing (an exception that may have been inserted
to avoid constitutional challenges). See id.; Sullivan, supra note 12, at 145. From a theoreti-
cal perspective, Measure 37's federal law exception seems to alter the baseline from which
takings are measured in Oregon. See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3) (C); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). As compared to Supreme Court jurisprudence,
which suggests that "background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance"
serve as a baseline, Measure 37 also exempts federal law from its definition of a regulatory
taking. See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3) (C); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
81 Oregonians in Action, Ballot Measure 37 Frequently Asked Questions No. 6, http://
www.measure37.com/measure%2037/faq.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2007).
82 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981); PLATER ET AL., supra note 21, at 305.
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Daily Loads ("TMDLs") and has developed related plans to achieve
these water quality goals.83 The state's TMDLs and corresponding im-
plementation plans are subject to the approval of the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (the "EPA").84 Because agriculture, forestry,
and other land use activities are responsible for a large percentage of
total water pollution, Oregon has included a number of land use con-
trols in its implementation plans.86 If these state land use rules, ap-
proved by the EPA pursuant to the CWA, were contested via a Measure
37 claim, could they be waived by the state of Oregon or are they "re-
quired to comply with federal law"? 86
A similar question can be asked about land use regulations
adopted by the state and local governments to comply with a number
of other federal laws that employ a cooperative federalism approach,
for example the Coastal Zone Management Act and the Safe Drinking
Water Act. 87 Accordingly, whether Measure 37's federal law exception
is interpreted broadly or narrowly may have significant implications
for Oregon's landscape. 88
Measure 49—on the ball& for a November 2007 special election
vote—could clear up this issue because it defines "federal law" as:
A statute, regulation, order, decree or policy enacted by a fed-
eral entity or by a state entity acting under authority delegated
by the federal government; [a] requirement contained in a
plan or rule enacted by a compact entity; or [a] requirement
contained in a permit issued by a federal or state agency pur-
suant to a federal or state regulation. 88
88 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1) (C), (d) (3), (e) (2000); Or. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, Total
Maximum Daily Loads Program, http://www.deq.state.or.us/wq/TMDLs/willarnette.htm
(last visited Feb. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Oregon TMDL Program]; see, e.g., OR, DEP'T OF
. ENVTL. QUALITY, WILLAMETTE. BASIN TMDL, CHAPTER 14: WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT
PLAN 4-5 (2006) [hereinafter WILLAmerre. BASIN PLAN], available at http://www.deq.
state.or.us/wq/TMDLs/willamette.htm.
" 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2), (e) (2).
85 See, e.g., WILLAMETTE BASIN PLAN, supra note 83; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, IN-
TRODUCTION TO 'DIE CLEAN WATER ACT 57, http://www.epa.gov/watertrain/cwa  (last
visited Sept. 21, 2007) [hereinafter EPA CWA INTRODUCTION].
86 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e) (2); OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3) (C); see, e.g., WILLAMETTE
BASIN PLAN, supra note 83.
87 See Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451-1465 (West 2000 &
Supp. 2007); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C,A. §§ 300f-300j-26 (West 2003 & Supp.
2007); MacLaren, supra note 20, at 66; Sullivan, supra note 12, at 145.
88 See Columbia, 152 P.3d at 1009; MacLaren, supra note 20, at 66; Sullivan, supra note
12, at 145.
89 MEASURE 49 TEXT, supra note 26, § 2(6).
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The remainder of this Note explains the context and importance of
this definition and argues for a broad interpretation of Measure 37's
federal law exception that is consistent with Measure 49.90
II. LAND USE REGULATION AS PART OF A FEDERAL FRAMEWORK
This Part reviews U.S. Supreme Court precedent that explains the
methods that Congress uses to require compliance with federal law, and
the constitutional limits of these methods.91 It then describes coopera-
tive federalism as a pervasive approach in modern environmental law
and introduces two cooperative federalism statutes that have significant
land use implications: the Clean Water Act and the Columbia River
Gorge National Scenic Area Act.92 Finally, it highlights the Oregon
Court of Appeals February 2007 decision in Columbia River Gorge Com-
mission v. Hood River County, holding that county land use ordinances
adopted pursuant to the Scenic Area Act are exempt from Measure 37
under the federal law exception."
A. Federal Regulation and Its Constitutional Limits
What options does Congress have to require compliance with a
federal law?" Where Congress has established authority to exercise leg-
islative power under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, it has
two choices.95 First, Congress can regulate individual activity directly."
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that Congress may do so even in ar-
eas of traditional state function such as land use. 97 Second, Congress
can provide states with incentives to administer regulatory programs
that address federal goals." However, Congress cannot regulate the
"States as States" by commanding state legislatures to adopt specific
laws or regulations or by directing state executive officials to enforce
federal laws.99
99 See infra notes 91-314 and accompanying text.
91 See infra notes 94-123 and accompanying text.
92 See infra notes 124-177 and accompanying text.
93 152 P.3d 997, 1004 (Or. Ct. App. 2007), review denied, 160 P.3d 992 (Or. 2007); see in-
fra notes 178-191 and accompanying text.
94 See OR. REv. STAT. § 197.352(3) (C) (2005); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
167 (1992).
95 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
as See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
97 See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 291 (1981).
99 See New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
ss Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York, 505 U.S. at 175-76; Hodel,
452 U.S. at 286-87.
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1. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n: An Endorsement
of Cooperative Federalism
In 1981 in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the Surface Mining Control and Recla-
mation Act of 1977 does not violate the Tenth Amendment.'m The
Act's interim program mandated immediate promulgation and federal
enforcement of environmental protection performance standards,
which could be complemented by ongoing state regulation."' Under
the permanent program, states had the option to develop and enforce
their own regulatory program so long as it met the Act's standards and
was approved by the Secretary of the Interior. 10" If states did not submit
a satisfactory program, or failed to submit a program at all, the Secre-
tary would develop and enforce a federal permanent program.I 03
The plaintiffs, an association of coal mining companies and several
individual landowners, argued that the performance standards for sur-
face mining on steep slopes under the interim program impermissibly
interfered with the traditional state and local power to regulate land
use and thus violated the Tenth Amendment.'" The Court disagreed,
holding that Congress's authority to regulate private activity was limited
only by the extent of its Commerce Power and that the standards were
valid even though they displaced the states' exercise of traditional po-
lice powers.'°5
Despite upholding such direct regulation of private activity, Justice
Marshall, writing for the majority, noted a "sharp distinction between
congressional regulation of private persons and businesses" and the
regulation of "States as States."'" The Court instructed that Congress
could not "commandeer" the "legislative process of states by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program."'° 7
Nevertheless, the Court found no such problem with the Surface Min-
ing Act because, under the permanent program, states could choose
Hode4 452 U.S. at 291.
101 Id. at 269.
102 Id. at 271.
10s Id. at 272.
104
	 at 273.
105 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 291-92.
100 Id, at 286.
167 Id. at 288.
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whether or not to bear the regulatory burden. 1 °8 The Court endorsed
the statute as a model of cooperative federalism. 109
2. New York v. United States and Printz v. United States The Anticomman-
deering Principle
In 1992, in New York v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down the take title provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Act of 1985, holding that the provision unconstitutionally comman-
deered state legislatures into serving federal purposes.m The State of
New York and two of its comities argued that the Waste Policy Act was
inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment." The Court upheld two key -
provisions of the Act that provided monetary and access incentives for
states to develop waste storage facilities within their borders." 2 The
Court also determined, however, that the Act's take tide provision was
problematic.'" The take title provision offered states a choice between
regulating radioactive waste according to Congress's instructions or
taking the title to (and associated liability for) the waste.'" Justice
. O'Connor, writing for the majority, noted that the first option, "a sim-
ple command to state governments to implement legislation enacted by
Congress," is beyond Congress's powers." 5 The Court further reasoned
that the alternative—requiring states to accept ownership of the waste—
would unconstitutionally 'commandeer' state governments into the
service of federal regulatory purposes."" 6 The Court concluded that
"[a] choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory tech-
ws
HY' Id. at 289. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, explained:
The most that can be said is that the Surface Mining Act establishes a pro-
gram of cooperative federalism that allows the States, within limits established
by federal minimum standards, to enact and administer their own regulatory
programs, structured to meet their own particular needs. In this respect, the
Act resembles a number of other federal statutes that have survived Tenth
Amendment challenges in the lower federal courts,
Id.
11 11
	York, 505 U.S. at 176.
' 1 ' Id. at 155.
112 Id. at 173,179.
115 Id. at 175-76.
114 Id. at 153-59,175-76.
1 ' 5 New York, 505 U.S. at 176.
1111 Id. at 175.
2007]	 The Federal Law Exception to Oregon's Measure 37	 1517
niques is no choice at all," and held the entire provision unconstitu-
tional." 7
In 1997, in Printz v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court extended
the anticommandeering principle from New York to executive func-
tions.118 There, two county chief law enforcement officers challenged
the constitutionality of interim provisions of the Brady Handgun Vio-
lence Prevention Act that required them to conduct background
checks on prospective handgun purchasers. 118 The Court held that the
Act violated the Tenth Amendment, reasoning that the federal gov-
ernment may not conscript state officers to administer or enforce a
federal regulatory program. 1"
Although the holding in New York clearly prohibits federal direc-
tives to states to promulgate and enforce specific laws or regulations,
the(Court identified at least two methods that Congress can use to in-
fluence state regulatory choices. 121 First, Congress may attach condi-
lions to federal funding in order to induce state or local action. 122 Sec-
ond, Congress may employ a cooperative federalism approach by
offering states the "choice of regulating that [private] activity according
to federal standards or having state law preempted by federal regula-
tion."'"
B. Cooperative Federalism: A Pervasive Model in Federal Environmental Law
Given the constitutional options available to the federal govern-
ment—to regulate individual activity directly or to provide states with
incentives to administer regulatory programs that address federal
goals—most federal statutes in the areas of environmental and land
use law adopt the latter approach.'" Only a very limited number of
federal environmental laws (for example, pesticide labeling rules and
regulations concerning defense generated nuclear waste) are imple-
" 7 Id. at 176.
"Prints, 521 U.S. at 935.
119 Id. at 902-04.
12° Id. at 935.
121 New York, 505 U.S. at 167,176.
122 Id. at 167.
129 Id. The Court summarized the distinction between these permissible means of en-
couraging state action and the unconstitutional take title provision as follows: "[W]hile
Congress has substantial power under the Constitution to encourage the States to provide
for the disposal of the radioactive waste generated within their borders, the Constitution
does not confer upon Congress the ability simply to compel the States to do so." Id. at 149.
154 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 21, at 305; Fischman, rufrn-s note 21, at 183-84.
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mented exclusively by the federal governrnent."5
 Instead, the vast ma-
jority of federal environmental laws involve some sort of federal-state
cooperation. 126 Many statutes employ a cooperative federalism ap-
proach to induce state action much like the permanent program of
the Surface Mining and Control and Reclamation Act in Hode1. 127
Under a cooperative federalism model, environmental standards
are set at the federal level and legal authority is delegated to states
that consent to take on planning, implementation, and/or enforce-
ment responsibilities to achieve those standards.'" Essentially, coop-
erative federalism statutes offer states the choice of regulating accord-
ing to federal standards or having state law preempted by federal
regulation.'" Faced with this choice, many states have chosen to ad-
minister federal environmental programs: approximately seventy-five
to eighty percent of the pollution control permits authorized by fed-
eral law are actually issued by state agencies 1" and as much as ninety-
six percent of total environmental enforcement actions are carried
out by state authorities. 151
Cooperative federalism is often referred to as a "carrot-and-stick
approach."2 Federal funding is a significant carrot, used to induce
states to accept responsibility for implementing federal programs.'"
States are also encouraged by the opportunity to tailor substantive
standards, control permitting, and choose environmental management
strategies in a way that is responsive to local environmental concerns
125
 Fischman, supra note 21, at 183.
IN PLATER rrAr., supra note 21, at 305; Fischman, supra note 21, at 183-84.
1 e7 Hyde', 452 U.S. at 271-72; PLATER ET AL., supra note 21, at 305. Cooperative federal-
ism rose with the New Deal as the national government became more involved in the op-
eration of state programs. Fischman, supra note 21, at 184-85. The approach took hold
and became an organizing concept in the environmental arena with the explosion of envi-
ronmental legislation in the 1970s. Id. at 187.
128 PLATER ET AL., supra note 21, at 305.
129 See New York, 505 U.S. at 167; see also Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inopera-
tive Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 719, 737 (2006) ("One terse definition of cooperative federalism is 'shared govern-
mental responsibilities for regulating private activity.'").
13° PLATER ET AL., supra note 21, at 306.
151 MARY E. BLAKESLEE & FANG RONG, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY CONTRIBU-
TIONS TO ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE 1-5 (2006). This figure includes enforcement
of federal programs delegated to states as well as some state-only programs. Id.
132 Fischman, supra note 21, at 189.
1" Id. at 190; Glicksman, supra note 129, at 738-39; see, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1256, 1329(h)
(2000 & Supp.1112003).
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and economic interests.' 34 If states elect not to take on the responsibil-
ity of administering federal programs, most cooperative federalism
statutes provide for direct federal regulation—a preemption stick. 133
Although the cooperative federalism model gives states flexibility
to create regulatory programs tailored to their needs, state-
administered programs remain subject to federal oversight:136 State
programs must be approved at the outset by the relevant federal agency
and, under most cooperative federalism statutes,. states must report
regularly thereafter on the status of implementation. 137 If state pro-
grams do not meet federal standards, the federal agency may withhold
federal funds or even pull the program, revoking the state's authority to
substitute for direct federal control.'" In addition to program over-
sight, some statutes give federal agencies the authority to veto individ-
ual state permitting decisions or override state enforcement actions. 139
A case that emphasizes the importance of such federal oversight
is the 1992 U.S. Supreme Court decision Arkansas v. Oklahoma, which
held that a federally approved state water quality standard under the
CWA is part of federal water pollution law. 14° The State of Oklahoma
challenged a permit the EPA granted to a sewage treatment plant in
Arkansas that discharged into the Illinois River less than forty miles
upstream from the Arkansas—Oklahoma border."' Oklahoma argued
that the EPA had to take greater account of the permit's effect on the
downstream state's ability to achieve its water quality standards. 142 The
Court held that Oklahoma's water quality standards "promulgated by
the State with substantial guidance from the EPA and approved by the
134 See Hode4 452 U.S. at 289; Fischman, supra note 21, at 192-93. In Hodel, Justice Mar-
shall, writing for the majority, described cooperative federalism as an approach that "allows
the States, within limits established by federal minimum standards, to enact and administer
their own regulatory programs, structured to meet their own particular needs." Ilodel, 452
U.S. at 289.
135 See New York 505 U.S. at 167-68; see, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 544e(c), 544f(1) (1) (2000); 33
U.S.C. § 1313(b) (1), (d) (2) (2000).
156 Fischman, supra note 21, at 190. 192; see, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 544d(f), 544e(b) (3),
544f(i), (j); 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1), (d) (2), (e).
137 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 544d(f), 544e(b) (3), 544f(i), (j); 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (1),
(d) (2), (e).
Is8 Fischman, supra note 21, at 192.
139 Glicksman, supra note 129, at 742.
140 Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 110 (1992).
H Id. at 95.
142 Id. In this case, Arkansas had not yet been authorized to issue point source permits,
and thus the EPA issued the permit to the sewage treatment plant directly. Id. at 103.
Oklahoma, on the other hand, had developed its own water quality standards, which had
been approved by the EPA. See id. at 95 n.2, 101.
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Agency ... are part of the federal law of water pollution control" and
could legitimately be applied to a permit decision across state lines. 143
Thus, the oversight required loy the CWA federalized the state water
quality standards. 144
Two federal statutes that employ a cooperative federalism ap-
proach—the Clean Water Act and the Columbia River Gorge National
Scenic Area Act—are described briefly below."6 The descriptions are
intended to illustrate the basic structure of federal-state cooperation
and demonstrate how state and local land use laws are included in
such federal frameworks. 146
1. The Clean Water Act
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, commonly known as
the Clean Water Act, is a quintessential cooperative federalism stat-
ute. 147 The CWA calls on states to establish water quality standards for
all intrastate waters and to submit them to the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency for approval."8 The CWA induces such action in
part through federal funding that is made available to those states
that create a regulatory scheme at least as stringent as the statute re-
quires. 149 If a state fails to submit water quality standards to the EPA or
143 Id. at 110. Although the Court held that the EPA had the authority to take into ac-
count Oklahoma's water quality standards in its Arkansas permitting decision, it upheld
the EPA's decision to grant the permit in Arkansas based on a finding that the new dis-
charges would cause no detectable violation of Oklahoma's water quality standards. Id. at
1 10-1 1 .
144 Id. at 110. The U.S. Courts of Appeals have extended the Arkansas rule to the Clean
Air Act, another cooperative federalism statute. See Safe Air for Everyone v. EPA, 475 F.3d
1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that once a State Implementation Plan is approved by
the EPA it has "the force and effect of federal law" and cannot be unilaterally changed by
the state); Sierra Club v. Leavitt, 368 F.3d 1300, 1305 n.9 (11th Cir. 2004) (reasoning in
dicta that a state permitting requirement is "sufficiently intertwined with the administra-
tion of the CAA that it can be considered part of the federal law of air pollution control").
They have not extended the rule, however, to the Surface Mining Control and Reclama-
tion Act. See Pa. Fed'n of Sportsmen's Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 326-27 (3d Cir.
2002) (distinguishing the "state-specific" nature of mining standards from the interstate
nature of the CWA where a federal role is integral); Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass'n, 248 F.3d
275, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that the Surface Mining Act is a scheme of mutually
exclusive regulation by either the U.S. Secretary of the Interior or the state regulatory
authority, unlike the CWA's 'unitary federal enforcement scheme" that incorporates state
law in certain circumstances).
145 See infra notes 147-177 and accompanying text.
143 See infra notes 147-177 and accompanying text.
147 See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 2001 & Supp. 2007).
148 See id. § 1313(a).
149 See id. §§ 1256, 1329(h).
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submits standards that do not meet CWA requirements, the EPA will
promulgate standards binding on that state. 150
The CWA recognizes that in many cases two kinds of pollution
management will be necessary to achieve water quality standards: 1)
point source or "end of pipe" controls that limit the amount of effluent
allowed from facilities such as sewage treatment plants, and 2) non-
point source controls. 15 ' Under the CWA, all point sources require a
permit from the National Pollutant Discharge and Elimination System
to ensure that the source meets federal technology-based standards. 152
Point source permitting may be delegated to the states and Oregon is
one of many states that have taken on this responsibility. 153
The CWA also calls on states to develop a list of impaired water-
bodies: rivers, lakes, and streams that are failing to achieve water qual-
ity standards despite point source controls. 154 Such waters are often
polluted mostly by nonpoint sources such as agriculture, forestry, and
other land use practices. 155 For each impaired waterbody, the CWA
requires states to develop TMDLs, quantitative pollution budgets for
pollutants such as mercury, E. coli, and heat. 156 As with water quality
standards, the EPA must approve state TMDLs and will step in and
establish TMDLs for 'relevant waterbodies if state standards do not
meet CWA requirements. 157
Oregon has accepted the responsibility for developing TMDLs
for its impaired waterbodies. 158 The state sets pollution budgets that
1 " See id. § 1315(b) (1).
' 5 ' See id. §§ 1311(a), 1313(d), (e), 1329, 1342,
162 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a) (1).
1 " See id. § 1342(a) (5); U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, National Pollutant Discharge Elimina-
tion System: State Program Status, http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm?program
id"" 12 (last visited Sept. 21, 2007).
154 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1) (A). States must also identify waters for which controls on
• thermal discharges "are not stringent enough to assure the protection and propagation of a
balanced indigenous population of shellfish, fish and wildlife." See id. § 1313(d) (1) (8).
1" See EPA CWA IwtstonucTioN, supra note 85, at 57. As the EPA explains:
According to states' 305(b) and 303(d) reports, more miles of rivers and
acres of lakes are impaired by overland runoff from rowcrop farming, live-
stock pasturing, and other types of nonpoint sources than by industrial facili-
ties, municipal sewage plants, and point source runoff from municipal storm
sewer systems and storm water associated with industrial activity.
Id.
155 33 U.S,C, § 1313(d)(1)(C), (D).
157 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2); EPA CWA INTRODUCTION, supra note 85, at 31 ("If EPA ul-
timately decides that it cannot approve a TMDL that has been submitted, the Agency
would need to develop and promulgate what it considers to be an acceptable TMDL.").
158 See Oregon TMDL Program, supra note 83.
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are consistent with the CWA requirement that "[flitch load [s] shall be
established at a level necessary to implement the applicable water
quality standards with seasonal variations and a margin of safety which
takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship
between effluent limitations and water quality." 159 Although the state's
TMDLs must meet this federal requirement, the state has significant
leeway in terms of how it allocates the quantitative pollution budgets
among pollution sources. 16° Oregon makes the allocations as part of a
planning process required by the CWA and on a regular basis submits
its plans for achieving water quality standards to the EPA for approval
in the form of basin-wide Water Quality Management Plans. 161 These
plans set out a framework of management strategies and identify spe-
cific state and local agencies responsible for carrying out those strate-
gies. 162 For example, the Willamette Basin Water Quality Management
Plan, approved recently by the EPA, incorporates Management Plans
and Rules developed by the Oregon Department of Agriculture, the
Oregon Forestry Practices Act administered by the state Department
of Forestry, the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality Non-
point Source Control Program Plan, and various city and county
TMDL implementation plans. 163
A significant number of land use regulations (as well as nonregula-
tory programs addressing land use) are included in Oregon's EPA-
approved plans to achieve water quality standards.'" For example, the
following land use regulations are implicated by the state's plans to
1" 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (d) (1) (C). The standard for thermal TMDLs is as follows:
[T]o assure protection and propagation of a balanced, indigenous popula-
don of shellfish, fish and wildlife. Such estimates shall take into account the
normal water temperatures, flow rates, seasonal variations, existing sources of
heat input, and the dissipative capacity of the identified waters or parts
thereof. Such estimates shall include a calculation of the maximum heat in-
put that can be made into each such part and shall include a margin of safety
which takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning the development
of thermal water quality criteria for such protection and propagation in the
identified waters or parts thereof.
Id. § 1313(d)(1)(D).
160 EPA CWA INTRODUCTION, supra note 85, at 34 ("States, territories and tribes are
free to allocate among sources in any way they see fit, so long as the sum of all the alloca-
tions is no greater than the overall loading cap.").
lel 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e); 40 C.F.R. § 130.5—.6 (2006); Oregon TMDL Program, supra
note 83. See generally WILLAMETTE BASIN PLAN, supra note 83.
162 See 40 C.F.R. § 130.6 ; see, e.g., WimArdrrri BASIN PLAN, supra note 83, at 4, 7.
163 See WILLAMETTE BASIN PLAN, SUPD2 note 83, at 7-9.
194 See id.; infra notes 165-167 and accompanying text.
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achieve its heat TMDLs in the Willamette Basin: Oregon Department
of Agriculture rules prohibiting landowners from restricting the growth
of streamside vegetation that provides shade and keeps water coo1, 165
riparian management provisions under the Oregon Forest Practices
Act, 166 and urban land use controls such as riparian protection overlays
that are included in municipal TMDL implementation plans. 167
2. The Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area Act
The Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area Act (the "Scenic
Area Act") also employs a cooperative federalism approach.' The Act
establishes a national scenic area to protect and enhance the pictur-
esque Columbia River Gorge, an eighty-mile long sea-level passage
through the Cascade Mountain Range dividing Oregon from Washing-
ton State. 169 The Act authorizes Oregon and Washington to enter into .
an interstate compact to create a new bistate Columbia River Gorge
Commission.'" Among other things, the Commission is tasked with
developing a Scenic Area Management Plan together with the U.S. For-
est Service. 171 By the terms of the ACt, the Management Plan must be
developed according to a specified process and it must include specific
land use designations and development standards that are consistent
with nine statutory standards.'"
165 See WILLAMETTE BASIN PLAN, Supra note 83, at 7-8, 12; see also Middle Willamette
Agricultural Water Quality Management Program, OR. ADMIN. R. 603-095-2340(1)(b)
(2002) ("By January 1, 2003, agricultural activities shall allow the growth and establish-
ment of vegetation along perennial streams consistent with site capability to promote infil-
tration of overland flow, streambank stability and provide moderation of solar heating.
Minimal breaks in shade vegetation for essential management activities are considered
appropriate.").
166 See WILLAMETTE BASIN PLAN, supra note 83, at 8, 12; see also Oregon Department of
Forestry, Water Protection Rules, Vegetation Retention Along Streams, OR. ADMIN. R. 629-
640.0000 to -0400 (2006).
167 See WILLAMETTE BASIN PLAN, supra note 83, at 9, 13.
166 See Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 544-544p (2000);
Columbia, 152 P.3d at 1000-03.
166 16 U.S.C. § 544a (2000); Brief and Supplemental Excerpt of Record of Plaintiff-
Respondent Columbia River Gorge Commission at 5-6, Columbia River Gorge Comm'n v.
Hood River Co., 152 P.3d 997 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (CA No. Al29652) [hereinafter Com-
mission's Brief]; USDA Forest Serv., Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area,
http://www.fs.fed.us/r6/columbia/forest (last visited Sept. 21, 2007). The Scenic Area
encompasses 292,000 acre area of private, state, county, tribal, and federal land on both
sides of the river. Commission's Brief, supra, at 6.
170 16 U.S.C. § 544c(a).
111 Id. § 544d.
172 Id.
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The land use regulations set out in the Management Plan are ad-
ministered through land use ordinances adopted by the six Gorge
counties (three in Oregon and three in Washington). 173 Although im-
plementation occurs at the county level, the federal government retains
an oversight role. 174 The U.S. Secretary of Agriculture must concur with
the Management Plan and supervise the Commission's approval of the
counties' land use ordinances. 175 The Act also contains an important
preemption provision: if any Gorge county does not adopt land use or-
dinances consistent with the Management Plan, the Commission must
adopt and administer land use ordinances in that county. 176 All three
Oregon counties and two of the Washington counties have adopted
land use ordinances pursuant to the Management Plan and the Com-
mission administers a land use ordinance in Klickitat County, Washing-
ton.177
C. Columbia River Gorge Commission v. Hood River County:
Cooperative Federalism Fits the Federal Law Exception
The scenic area ordinances on the Oregon side of the Gorge
were recently the subject of a Measure 37 lawsuit. 178 In Columbia River
Gorge Commission. v. Hood River County, decided in February 2007, the
Oregon Court of Appeals held that Measure 37 does not apply to
county land use ordinances adopted pursuant to the Management
Plan because they are required to comply with the Scenic Area Act. 179
The case began when two private landowners filed Measure 37
claims seeking compensation or a waiver of minimum lot size require-
ments that restricted their ability to subdivide and develop their prop-
erties. 18° The contested land use regulations were imposed by Hood
In Id. §§ 544e(b), 544f(h). The three Oregon counties are Hood River, Multnomah,
and Wasco; the three Washington counties are Clark, Klickitat, and Skamania. Id. § 544(d).
"4 Id. §§ 544d(f); 544f(j).
"8 16 U.S.C. §§ 544d(f); 544f(j).
178 Id. §§ 544e(c); 544f (l) (1).
1" Columbia River Gorge Commission, Land Use Ordinance § 350-81 (Aug. 1, 2006);
CLARK COUNTY, WA., CODE § 40.240 (2006); HOOD RIVER COUNTY, OR., CODE art. 75
(2005); MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OR., CODE ch. 38 (2006); SKAMANIA COUNTY, WA., CODE
title 22 (2005); Wasco County, Or., National Scenic Area Land Use & Development Ordi-
nance ( Jan. 10, 2006).
"8 See generally Columbia, 152 P.3d 997.
"9 Id. at 1004.
190
 Id. at 999. One landowner contested a two acre minimum lot size requirement that
applies to his property, and the other landowner contested a forty acre minimum lot size
requirement that applies to his land, which is located in a different part of the scenic area.
Commission's Brief, supra note 169, at 10.
2007]	 The Federal Law Exception to Oregon's Measure 37 	 1325
River County pursuant to the Scenic Area Management Plan."" Hood
River County was prepared to approve the claims because of the threat
of attorney's fees imposed by Measure 37. 182 However, the Commission,
in cooperation with the three Oregon counties affected by the Scenic
Area Act, sought a declaratory judgment as to whether the counties'
land use ordinances fell within Measure 37's federal law exception. 183
The landowners were included as necessary parties; the State of Ore-
gon and Friends of the Columbia Gorge, a nonprofit organization, in-
tervened on the side of the Commission. 184 The trial court issued a de-
claratory judgment in favor of the Commission on August 1, 2006, and
the landowners appealed the decision to the Oregon Court of Ap-
peals. 188
In February 2007, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court decision, holding that the county land use ordinances enacted
in accordance with and to implement the Scenic Area Management
Plan are within the scope of Measure 37's federal law exception.'
The court reasoned that the nine "goal-like" statutory standards in the
Scenic Area Act are insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the fed-
eral law•; rather, the Scenic Area Act explicitly requires land use ordi-
nances such as the minimum lot size requirements at issue in the
case. 187 In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on the Commis-
sion's power to disapprove county ordinances that do not meet the
Act's requirements and to enact ordinances consistent with the Act
should the counties fail to do so themselves.' The court also empha-
sized the degree of federal oversight provided by the Scenic Area Act,
noting the Secretary of Agriculture's responsibility for approving the
Management Plan and county ordinances. 189
The Supreme Court of Oregon denied the landowners' petition
for review on May 22, 2007, thus securing the precedential value of the
181 Columbia, 152 P.3d at 999.
182 Telephone Interview with Jeffrey B. Litwak, Counsel, Columbia River Gorge Com-
mission (Nov. 4, 2006) [hereinafter Litwak Interview].
181 OR. REV. STAT. § 28.020 (2005); Columbia, 152 P.3d at 999; Litwak Interview, supra
note 182.
184 Columbia, 152 P.3d at 999; Litwak Interview, supra note 182.
185 Columbia, 152 P.3d at 999-1000. Oregonians in Action, the lead organization be-
hind the Measure 37 campaign, represented the landowners. Appellant's Brief and Ex-
cerpt of the Record at 24, Columbia River Gorge Comrn'n v. Hood River Co., 152 P.3d 997
(Or. Ct. App. 2007) (CA No. Al29652) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief],
1" Columbia, 152 P.3d at 1004.
IP Id.
ma Id. at 1002-03.
IN Id. at 1004.
1326	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 48:1301
Court of Appeals' decision.'" Significantly, Columbia highlights three
aspects of the Scenic Area Act that are common to other cooperative
federalism statutes: 1) "goal-like" statutory standards that require fur-
ther development and implementation at the state or local level, 2) an
agency with the authority to preempt state and local regulations, and 3)
federal approval of locally administered regulatory programs.' 91
M. THE CASE FOR A BROAD INTERPRETATION OF MEASURE 37's
FEDERAL LAW EXCEPTION
Cooperative federalism statutes are complex, each with a unique
purpose and construction, and each with a different combination of
carrots and sticks that set up federal-state relationships. 192 Although
every federal statute is distinct, some of their common elements suggest
that many of the land use regulations that form part of federally ap-
proved state programs should be exempt from Measure 37. 193 Drawing
on the reasoning in the Oregon Court of Appeals February 2007, deci-
sion in Columbia River Gorge Commission v. Hood River County, and using
the CWA as an example, this Part argues for an expansive interpreta-
tion of Measure 37's federal law exception.'" First, this Part suggests
that while several interpretations are possible, the federal law excep-
tion's text best supports a broad interpretation of the provision. 196 Sec-
ond, this Part explains that constitutional principles of federalism pre-
clude a narrow interpretation of the federal law exception. 196 Next, this
Part analyzes elements common to many cooperative federalism stat-
utes—including preemption provisions and federal approval require-
ments—and argues that these elements support a broad interpretation
of the federal law exception. 197 In view of these legal rationales, as well
as the practical consequences of a narrow interpretation, this Part con-
cludes that Measure 37's federal law exception should be interpreted
broadly to include all land use regulations contained in federally-
approved plans and programs that represent Oregon's efforts to corn-
19° Colombia River Gorge Comm'n v. Hood River County, 160 P.3d 992, 992 (Or.
2007).
191 Columbia, 152 P.3d at 1002-04.
192 See supra notes 124-177 and accompanying text.
199 See infra notes 229-314 and accompanying text.
194 See infra notes 201-314 and accompanying text.
199 See infra notes 201-218 and accompanying text.
196 See infra notes 219-228 and accompanying text.
197 See infra notes 229-314 and accompanying text.
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ply with federal law.'" This view is reinforced by Measure 49's explicitly
broad definition of federal law.'" Thus, these arguments demonstrate
one key reason to support Measure 49's passage .200
A. The Text of Measure 37's Federal Law Exception Best Supports a Broad
Interpretation of the Provision
The text of Measure 37's federal law exception states that the
Measure does not apply to a given land use regulation "to the extent
the land use regulation is required to comply with federal law."201 One
potential interpretation of this text is that the exception covers only
those federal laws that directly regulate the land use activities of indi-
vidual citizens. 202 Although such laws are clearly exempt from Measure
37, there are several compelling reasons why the exception must be
broader in scope. 2°5 First, even without the federal law exception,
Measure 37 would be preempted in cases where its operation conflicts
with federal laws directly regulating the land use practices of individu-
als, so the exception must mean something more. 204 Second, state and
local governments receiving Measure 37 claims have no authority to
waive federal laws that apply directly to individual properties, even if
the claims otherwise meet the requirements of Measure 37. 205 Third,
Measure 37 concerns state and local land use regulations; it follows that
198 See infra notes 201-314 and accompanying text.
199
	 supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text; infra notes 210-314 and accompany-
ing text.
200 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text; infra notes 210-314 and accompany-
ing text.
201 OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3) (C) (2005). The Oregon courts apply the same meth-
odology to interpreting statutory provisions adopted thiough the initiative process as they
do to the construction of any other statute. Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 11 P.3d 228, 239
(Or. 2000). The text of the statutory provision is the starting point for interpretation and is
considered the best evidence of the voters' intent. Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v Bureau of
Labor and Indus., 859 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Or. 1993); Roseburg Sch. Dist. v. City of Roseburg,
851 P.2d 595, 597 (Or. 1993).
202 See On. REV. STAT. § 197.352 (3) (C).
2°S See infra notes 204-206 and accompanying text.
2°4 See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) (holding
that "[title test of whether both federal and state regulations may operate, or the state
regulation must give way, is whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing
the federal superintendence of the field"); City of Astoria v. Kozer, 264 P. 445, 446 (Or.
1928) (stating that the court must ascertain the legislative intention from the language
used and adopt such construction of the Act as to give effect, if possible, to all provisions
thereof).
"5 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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the exceptions to the rule are about state and local regulations as
well.206
Seeking a more workable, but still narrow interpretation of the
federal law exception, property rights advocates have suggested that the
provision applies only when a federal law truly mandates the adoption
of a state or local land use regulation. 207 This interpretation relies on
the plain meaning of the word "required"; activity that is demanded or
compulsory. 208 Under this view, state and local governments can deny
Measure 37 claims based on the federal law exception only when the
regulation at issue is absolutely required by federal law. 2°9 This interpre-
tation is discussed in greater detail below and is referred to throughout
the remainder of this Note as the "narrow interpretation. "210
Despite the high degree of compulsion suggested by the term "re-
quired," the text of the federal law exception better supports a signifi-
candy broader interpretation.m The phrase "to comply with" expands
the meaning of the exception to include activity that may not be abso-
lutely required but is nonetheless necessary to conform with federal
law.212 Further textual support for a broad interpretation of the provi-
sion comes from its context. 215 A parallel exception regarding public
206 See OR. Rev. STAT. § 197.352(11)(B). Measure 37's definitions section provides:
Land use regulation" shall include: (i) Any statute regulating the use of land
or any interest therein; (ii) Administrative rules and goals of the Land Con-
servation and Development Commission; (iii) Local government comprehen-
sive plans, zoning ordinances, land division ordinances, and transportation
ordinances; (iv) Metropolitan service district regional framework plans, func-
tional plans, planning goals and objectives; and (v) Statutes and administra-
tive rules regulating farming and forest practices.
Id.
"7 See Appellan Cs Brief, supra note 185, at 4; Oregonians in Action, supra note 81 (stat-
ing that the federal law exception applies only when federal law truly mandates the ado p.
tion of a state or local land use law").
"a See Appellant's Brief, supra note 185, at 4; MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DIC-
TIONARY 995 (10th ed. 1994); Oregonians in Action, supra note 81. The relevant diction-
ary definitions of "require" are: "1 a; to claim or ask for by right and authority ... 2 a: to
call for as suitable or appropriate ... b: to demand as necessary or essential: to have a
compelling need for ... 3: to impose a compulsion or command on: COMPEL . . . syn see
DEMAND." MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, SUpra, at 995.
211° See Appellant's Brief, supra note 185, at 4; Oregonians in Action, supra note 81.
210 See infra notes 219-314 and accompanying text.
211 See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3)(C); see infra notes 212-218 and accompanying text.
212 See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3) (C); MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY,
Supra note 208, at 236. The relevant dictionary definition of comply is: "2: to conform or
adapt one's actions to another's wishes, to a rule, or to necessity." MERRIAM WEBSTER'S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 208, at 236.
219 See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.532(3) (A).
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nuisances includes the phrase:	 his subsection shall be construed
narrowly in favor of a finding of compensation under this section. "214
This admonition to read the nuisance exception narrowly is omitted
from the federal law exception, which follows two lines down in the
statute's text. 215 Rules of construction provide that this difference favors
a broader interpretation of the federal law exception, or at least disfa-
vors a narrow one. 216
Importantly, a broad interpretation of the federal law exception
could encompass a wide array of state and local land use regulations
necessary to comply with federal laws that employ a cooperative feder-
alism approach. 217 This "broad interpretation" and its implications are
discussed below 218
B. Constitutional Principles of Federalism Preclude a Narrow Interpretation of
Measure 37's Federal Law Exception
Although Measure 37's text does not make it entirely clear what
degree of compulsion is intended by the federal law exception, the U.S.
Supreme Court has clearly established an upper limit. 219 Measure 37
was passed in 2004 and therefore must be interpreted in light of New
York v. United States and Printz v. United States, decided in 1992 and 1997,
respectively. 22° These cases provide that it is unconstitutional for Con-
214 1d.
216 See id. § 197332(3) (A), (C).
216 See id.; In re Marriage of Perlenfein, 848 P.2d 604, 607-08 (Or. 1993) (stating that
use of a term in one section and not in another section of the same statute indicates a
purposeful omission). If the voters' intent remains unclear after an interpretation of a
statute's text, the Oregon courts proceed to a second level of analysis, which is to consider
the history of the provision. Portland Gen. Elec., 859 P.2d at 1146. The focus of this inquiry
is on information available to voters at the time the measure was adopted that discloses the
public's understanding of the measure, for example the ballot title and information in the
Voter's pamphlet. Ecumenical Ministries v. Or. State Lottery Comm'n, 871 P.2d 106, 111
n.8 (Or. 1994); see also Striffler Letter,' supra note 74, at 5 (referring to the Voter's pam-
phlet as the "primary source of Measure 37's history"). Measure 37's ballot title, "Govern-
ments must pay owners, or forgo enforcement, when certain land use restrictions reduce
property value," indicates that voters understood that the scope of regulations covered by
the Measure was to be limited in some way; however the Voter's pamphlet contains no
explicit discussion of the federal law exception. See BRADBURY, supra note 1, at 103-32
(emphasis added).
217 See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 2001 & Supp. 2007); Oa. REV.
STAT. § 197.532(3) (C) .
215 See infra notes 219-314 and accompanying text.
211/ See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.532{3)(C); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935
(1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 194,176 (1992).
fle See Olt. REV. STAT. § 197.352; Print-c, 521 U.S. at 935; New lirric, 505 U.S. at 176.
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gress to commandeer state legislatures or executive officials into serv-
ing federal purposes. 221 Therefore, Measure 37's federal law exception
cannot possibly be limited to land use regulations adopted under fed-
eral mandates directing Oregon to enact specific rules or to administer
federal regulatory programs. 222 Just as Congress could not compel the
State of New York to adopt a particular regulatory program to deal with
radioactive waste in New York, Congress cannot prescribe specific land
use regulations to be adopted by the Oregon legislature. 225 And just as
Congress could not require county law enforcement officers to conduct
background checks in Prints, Congress cannot compel Oregon's De-
partment of Environmental Quality or other agencies to enforce fed-
eral environmental programs. 224
Instead, the federal law exception must encompass the normal
and constitutional "carrot-and-stick" approach used by the federal gov-
ernment to induce state action. 225 As Justice O'Connor explained in
New York, Congress may condition federal funding upon state action. 2"
Congress may also give states a choice between regulating up to federal
standards or being preempted by federal regulation. 227 Indeed, coop-
erative federalism has become a dominant approach to federal envi-
ronmental regulation during the last four decades and a number of
federal laws with significant land use implications employ this struc-
ture.228
C. Preemption Provisions in Cooperative Federalism Statutes Suggest That
Substitute State Action is "Required to Comply with Federal Law"
Most cooperative federalism statutes induce state action in part
through the threat of preemption: if states do not take on the responsi-
bility for implementing the federal mandate, or if state programs do
221 Printz, 521 U.S. at 935; New York, 505 U.S. at 176.
222 See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3) (C); Printz, 521 U.S. at 935; New York 505 U.S. at
176.
223 See Oft, REV. STAT. § 197.352(3)(C); New York, 505 U.S. at 176.
224 See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3)(C); hints, 521 U.S. at 935.
226 See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3) (C); New York, 505 U.S. at 167; Hodel v. Va. Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981).
226 New York, 505 U.S. at 167.
227 Id.; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 289.
226 See Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 544-544p (2000);
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1951-1465 (West 2000 & Supp.
2007); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 2001 & Supp. 2007); Safe Drink-
ing Water Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300f-300j-26 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007); Fischman, supra
note 21, at 187.
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not meet federal standards, the relevant federal agency will step in and
regulate directly. 229 In Columbia, the court relied in part on the preemp-
tion features of the Scenic Area Act to conclude that the county land
use ordinances at issue were "required to comply with federal law.""°
Under the Scenic Area Act, if the Gorge counties did not adopt land
use ordinances consistent with the Management Plan, the scenic area
would be regulated by the Columbia River Gorge Commission."' Simi-
larly, under the CWA, if Oregon failed to adopt water quality standards
or TMDLs, the U.S. EPA would step in and set pollution budgets for the
state.232 Such preemption provisions suggest that when Oregon accepts
the responsibility for administering a federal program, the state acts as
an assignee for the federal government and the state's regulations serve
as a substitute for direct federal regulation. 233 If Measure 37 does not
apply to direct federal regulation, it seems only logical that state laws
that take the place of direct federal regulation are also "required to
comply with federal law."234
On the other hand, property rights advocates have argued that
preemption provisions give Oregon a choice of whether to develop its
own regulatory approach or to accept direct federal regulation. 235 The
state's ability to make this choice is critical, they contend, because it
means that state activity under the auspices of cooperative federalism
statutes is voluntary and not "required to comply with federal law." 236
The question presented by the federal law exception, however, is
not whether the initial assumption of authority by a state to administer
229 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 544e(c), 544f(1) (1); 33 U.S.C. § 1313(b) (1), (d) (2).
230 See Columbia River Gorge Contrn'n v. Hood River County, 152 P.3d 997, 1002, 1003
(Or. Ct. App. 2007), review denied, 160 P.3d 992 (Or. 2007).
231 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 544e(c), 544f(1) (1); Columbia, 152 P.3d at 1002, 1003.
2" See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(b) (1), (d) (2). It is less clear how the EPA would respond if
Oregon failed to develop and administer the more specific Water Quality Management
Plans aimed at achieving TMDLs and water quality standards. See Sierra Club v. Meiburg,
296 F.3d 1021, 1034 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that after Georgia failed to establish TMDLs
in a timely fashion, the EPA was responsible for developing TMDLs for the state's unpaired
waters but only had a supervisory role with regard to their implementation).
233 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 544e(c), 544f(1) (1); 33 U.S.C. § 1313(b) (1), (d) (2).
234 See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3) (C) (2005); Columbia, 152 P.3d at 1002, 1003; see,
e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 544e(c), 544f(1) (1); 33 U.S.C. § 1313(b) (1), (d) (2).
225 Appellant's Brief, supra note 185, at 4.
236 Id. In Columbia, the landowners argued that because the Oregon Gorge counties
had the option of adopting land use ordinances consistent with the Management Plan and
could have instead allowed the Columbia River Gorge Commission to directly regulate
their portion of the scenic area, the county ordinances were not required to comply with
federal law. Id.
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a federal program is required or voluntary. 2" As discussed above, con-
stitutional principles dictate that Oregon cannot be absolutely required
to adopt specific laws or administer federal programs; the state must be
given a choice.238 The real question presented by Measure 37's federal
law exception is: once a state accepts responsibility for a delegated pro-
gram, what specific land use regulations are "required to comply with
federal law”?2"
D. What Amounts to Compliance?
Admittedly, answering the question of what constitutes compliance
under many cooperative federalism statutes is not easy. 240 In Columbia,
the court was able to readily determine that the county ordinances are
required to comply with the Scenic Area Act because the minimum lot
size regulations at issue are derived directly from the Scenic Area Man-
agement Plan. 241 However, most cooperative federalism statutes do not
have something equivalent to the Management Plan, an interim step
between the broad policies and goals of the Scenic Area Act and the
on-the-ground application of the law by the Gorge counties. 242 Instead,
under most cooperative federalism statutes, states must adhere to some
level of agency guidance but have more liberty to elect what specific
932 See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3) (C); Printz, 521 U.S. at 935; New York, 505 U.S. at 176.
233 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 935; New York, 505 U.S. at 176. Because Measure 37 must be
interpreted in light of these anticommandeering principles, a narrow interpretation would
be a nullity, and only a somewhat broader interpretation makes sense. See OR. REV. STAT.
§ 197.352(3) (C); Printz, 521 U.S. at 935; New York, 505 U.S. at 176. Notably, the choice pre-
sented to states in many cooperative federalism statutes appears mandatory. See, e.g., 33
U.S.C. § 1313(a) (2), (a) (3) (A). For example, the text of the CWA demands that each state
"shall' submit water quality standards to the EPA. Id. However, in view of the statute as a
whole, such language has been interpreted as a quid pro quo between the states and the
federal government: states that do not submit water quality standards that meet CWA re-
quirements must accept federal standards and forgo funding for their water quality pro-
grams. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1256, 1329(h) (2000 & Supp. III 2003); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503
U.S. 91, 101 (1992).
239 See OR. REv. STAT. § 197.352(3)(C); Printz, 521 U.S. at 935; New York, 505 U.S. at
176.
240 See infra notes 241-249 and accompanying text.
241 See HOOD RIVER COUNTY, OR., Come art. 75 (2005); Columbia, 152 P.3d at 999, 1004;
U.S. FOREST SERV. & COLUMBIA RIVER GORGE COMM'N, MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE CO-
LUMBIA RIVER GORGE NATIONAL SCENIC AREA [hereinafter SCENIC AREA MANAGEMENT
PLAN]; Commission's Brief, supra note 169, at 10.
242 See 16 U.S.C. § 544d (2000); SCENIC AREA MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 241; see,
e.g., Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451-1465 (West 2000 & Supp.
2007); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 2001 & Supp. 2007); Safe Drink-
ing Water Act, 42 U,S.C.A. §§ 300f-300j-26 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007).
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tools they will use to achieve federal goals. 243 Indeed, this flexibility is
why many states choose to administer federal programs in the first
place.244
For example, the Water Quality Management Plans that Oregon
submits to the EPA represent a package of regulatory and nonregula-
tory initiatives that the state considers to be the most effective way to
achieve water quality standards under the CWA. 245 Thus, there is some
merit to the argument that because other regulatory (or nonregulatory)
approaches are available to the state, the individual land use regulations
contained in Water Quality Management Plans are not "required to
comply with federal law."246 Furthermore, some of the regulations de-
scribed in the Plans were developed specifically in response to the CWA
whereas others may not have been initiated for the express purpose of
achieving federal water quality standards. 247 Are land use regulations
that were selected by the state when other options were available, some
not even enacted in direct response to the CWA, "required to comply
with federal law?"248 The overall structure of cooperative federalism
statutes, their federal approval requirements, and the practical conse-
quences of a narrower interpretation suggest that the best answer to this
question is yes. 249
I. Compliance Requires Specific Land Use Regulations That Go
Beyond Statutory Goals
In Columbia, the landowners addressed the difficult question of
what constitutes compliance by arguing that only the nine standards
listed in the Scenic Area Act, among them goals like "protect and en-
hance open spaces" —and not the more specific regulations con-
tained in the Management Plan and the county ordinances—are "re-
quired to comply with federal law.'"250 This argument was rejected by
the Oregon Court of Appeals and fails in several respects. 251
245 See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 289; Fischman, supra note 21, at 192-93.
544 See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 289; Fischman, supra note 21, at 192-93.
245 See generally WILLAMETTE BASIN PLAN, supra note 83.
245 See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3) (C) (2005). See generally WILLAMETTE BASIN PLAN,
supra note 83.
547 See, e.g., WILLAMETTE BASIN PLAN, supra note 83, at 11-13.
242 See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3) (C); see, e.g., WILLAMETTE BASIN PLAN, supra note
83, at 11-13.
249 See infra notes 250-314 and accompanying text.
. 25° See Columbia, 152 P.3d at 1002-04; Appellant's Brief, supra note 185, at 4, 8-9. As a
further illustration, the first three standards listed in the Scenic Area Act are:
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The landowners' argument implied that statutory standards are
directly implementable. 252 As the court concluded, however, this
proposition defies the very text of the Scenic Area Act and the con-
cept of "standards" therein. 253 Notably, the Act specifies that the Man-
agement Plan should be based on the results of a resource inventory
carried out pursuant to the Act and should include "land use designa-
tions."254 The Act also spells out that the Management Plan and all
ordinances adopted pursuant to the Act "shall include provisions to"
achieve the nine standards listed in the Act. 255 The court concluded
that read as a whole, the Act "requires a degree of detail and rigor in
the management plan and implementing ordinances far transcend-
ing" the nine "goal-like" standards set out in the Act. 256
As in the Scenic Area Act, the explicit standards or requirements
in most cooperative federalism statutes are broad, "goal-like" policies
or criteria used to evaluate more specific state action and do not rep-
resent a prescription for direct implementation.257 In other words, the
policies set forth in most cooperative federalism statutes will have no
on-the-ground effect unless the states develop regulatory schemes to
achieve them. 258 For example, the CWA calls on states to set TMDL
pollution budgets and describes what acceptable TMDLs must take
into account. 259 Thus, the statutory requirement serves as a measuring
(1) protect and enhance agricultural lands for agricultural uses and to allow,
but not require, conversion of agricultural lands to open space, recreation
development or forest lands; (2) protect and enhance forest lands for forest
uses and to allow, but not require, conversion of forest lands to agricultural
lands, recreation development or open spaces; (3) protect and enhance open
spaces.
16 U.S.C. § 544d(d) (2000). The more specific regulations in the Management Plan and
county ordinances include, for example, minimum lot size requirements such as those
challenged in the case, recreation area designations, and compatability requirements for
land use in rural areas. See SCENIC AREA MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 241.
251 See Columbia, 152 P.3d at 1004; infra notes 252-256 and accompanying text.
252 See Columbia, 152 P.3d at 1003-04.
256 See id. at 1004.
154 See 16 U.S.C. § 544d (c) (1), (2); Columbia, 152 P.3d at 1004.
265 See 16 U.S.C. § 544d(d); Columbia, 152 P.3d at 1001.
256 See Columbia, 152 P.3d at 1004. The court noted that "Defendant's view of what the
Scenic Area Act 'requires' with respect to promulgation of the management plan is artifi-
cially and implausibly crabbed; that view cannot be reconciled with the federal Act's com-
prehensive design and operation." Id.
257 See Columbia, 152 P.3d at 1004; see, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1) (C),
(D) (2000).
255 See Columbia, 152 P.3d at 1004; see, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1) (C), (D).
159 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1) (C) The CWA declares:
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stick for state action.26° Oregon still must set quantitative pollution
limits and develop plans to achieve its TMDLs in order to make any
real progress toward achieving federal water quality goals. 261
In the case of the CWA, property rights advocates might argue that
even if the Act requires states to set TMDLs, it does not require related
implementation plans because the text of the CWA refers only to a
"continuing planning process."262 When the statute is considered as a
whole, however, it becomes clear that the required planning process
must include specific management activities beyond the quantitative
pollution budgets. 263 TMDLs by definition are established only when a
waterbody is impaired, which means that point source controls alone
have not proven sufficient to achieve water quality standards. 264 Oregon
must therefore address nonpoint sources. 265
 To this end, the state has
developed a package of management activities, including land use con-
trols, in the form of Water Quality Management Plans. 266 This package
of controls is reviewed periodically by the EPA and approved only if cer-
tain requirements are met. 267 Thus, Oregon's responsibility to comply
with the CWA does not end with setting TMDLs but requires adequate
Each state shall establish [for impaired waterbodies] and in accordance with
the priority ranking, the total maximum daily load, for those pollutants which
the Administrator identifies under section 304(a) (2) as suitable for calcula-
tion. Such load shall be established at a level necessary to implement the ap-
plicable water quality standards with seasonal variations and a margin of safety
which takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship
between effluent limitations and water quality.
Id.
260 See id.
261 See id.; Columbia, 152 P.3d at 1004. See generally WILLAMETTE BASIN PLAN, supra note
83.
262 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e) ("Each state shall have a continuing planning process ap-
proved ... which is consistent with this chapter."); Appellant's Brief, supra note 185, at 4,
8-9; see also Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1140 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that al-
though the CWA requires a continuing planning process informed by TMDLs, "rs] tates
must implement TMDLs only to the extent that they seek to avoid losing federal grant
money; there is no pertinent statutory provision otherwise requiring the implementation
of § 303 plans or providing for their enforcement").
263 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1313, 1342.
"4 See id. §§ 1311(b) (1) (A)—(B), 1313(d) (1) (A)—(D), 1342.
265 See id.
2" See id. § 1313(e), See generally WILLAMETTE BASIN PLAN, supra note 83.
267 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e); 40 C.F.R. § 130.5—.6 (2006). Minimum requirements of the
continuing planning process include a description of "[Mile process for establishing and
assuring adequate implementation of new or revised water quality standards, including
schedules of compliance." 40 C.F.R. § 130.5.
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implementation of its chosen package of federally approved manage-
ment activides. 266
2. Land Use Regulations Contained in Federally Approved Plans and
Programs Should Be Considered Exempt from Measure 37
States must do more than merely adopt federal statutory goals to
comply with most cooperative federalism statutes, but what specific
regulations are "required"?269 Measure 37's federal law exception should
be interpreted to include all land use regulations in federally approved
plans and programs that represent the state's efforts to comply with fed-
eral law.27°
Such an encompassing interpretation of the federal law excep-
tion is justified because the federal approval requirements in coopera-
tive federalism statutes make federal agencies responsible for decid-
ing what constitutes compliance.271 In Columbia, the Oregon Court of
Appeals relied in part on the oversight role of the Secretary of Agri-
culture—responsible for approving the Scenic Area Management Plan
and county land use ordinances—to conclude that Measure 37 does
not apply to the county ordinances. 272 The court implied that because
the Secretary of Agriculture must sign off on the Management Plan
and county ordinances, it is ultimately the federal agency that defines
compliance and Oregon cannot pick and choose which land use regu-
lations within its federally approved program are "required to comply
with federal law. "275
The importance of this federal approval element has also been
recognized in the context of the CWA. 274 In its 1992 decision, Arkansas
v. Oklahoma, the U.S. Supreme Court held that state programmatic
activity was federalized where the CWA required federal review and
approval. 275 This rule may be extended to other components of the
CWA. 276 For example, much like the water quality standards in Arkan-
268 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1) (A)—(D), (e). See generally WILLAMETTE BASIN PLAN, supra
note 83.
269 See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3) (C) (2005).
27° See infra notes 271-314 and accompanying text.
271 See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3)(C); Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 110; see, e.g., Columbia
River Gorge National Scenic Area Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 544d(1), 544f(j) (2000); 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(d) (2), (e) (2).
272 See Columbia, 152 P.3d at 1004.
273 See id.
274 See Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 110.
275 See id.
276 See id.; see, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d), (e).
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sas, Oregon's TMDLs and Water Quality Management Plans are EPA-
approved and are based on substantial guidance from the agency. 277
The U.S. Courts of Appeals have extended the Arkansas rule to the
Clean Air Act and it may well apply to other cooperative federalism
statutes, particularly those statutes that address environmental prob-
lems with interstate effects.278 Thus, many of Oregon's federally ap-
proved plans, and programs developed under cooperative federalism
statutes, although not directly implemented by the federal govern-
ment, might be considered incorporated into federal law. 278 If this is
the case, such plans and programs are certainly "required to comply
with federal law," and the land use regulations they contain should be
exempt from Measure 37. 28°
A broad interpretation of the federal law exception is further
supported by the fundamental goals and policies of cooperative fed-
eralism statutes. 281 The objective of the CWA is to "restore and main-
tain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters."282 In order to achieve this objective, the CWA declares that "it
is the national policy that programs for the control of nonpoint
sources of pollution be developed and implemented in an expeditious
manner so as to enable the goals of this Act to be met through the con-
trol of both point and nonpoint sources of pollution." 83 A broad in-
terpretation of the federal law exception that protects the land use
regulations in Oregon's federally approved Water Quality Manage-
ment Plans is consistent with this important mandate. 2" On the other
277 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2), (e) (2); Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 110; 40 C,F,R. § 130.5—.6
(2006); Oregon TMDL Program, supra note 83; see, e.g., Memorandum from Benjamin H.
Grumbles, EPA Assistant Administrator on Establishing TMDL -Daily" Loads (Nov. 16, 2006)
[hereinafter Grumbles Memorandum], available at
loadsguidance.h tml.
278 See Safe Air for Everyone v. EPA, 475 F.3d 1096. 1105 (9th Cir. 2007); Sierra Club v.
Leavitt, 368 F.3d 1300, 1304 (11th Cir. 2004); see, e.g., Coastal Zone Management Act of
1972, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451-1465 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42
U.S.CA §§ 300f-300j-26 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007).
279 See Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 110; Safe Air for Everyone, 475 F.3d at 1105; Leavitt, 368 F.3d
at 1304.
281' See Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 110; Safe Airfar Everyone, 475 F.3d at 1105; Leavitt, 368 F.3d
at 1304. The logical extension of this argument is that as federal law, these federally ap-
proved plans and programs would preempt Measure 37 even without the federal law ex-
ception in cases where there was a direct conflict between the laws. See OR, REV. STAT.
§ 197.352(3) (C) (2005); Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 110; Fla. Lime, 373 U.S. at 142.
281 See Oa. REv. STAT. § 197.352 (3 ) (C); see, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) .
2e2 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
283 Id. § 1251 (a) (7) (emphasis added) .
284 See id. § 1251(a), (a) (7); OR. REV, STAT. § 197.352(3)(C).
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hand, a narrow interpretation that would subject those same regula-
tions to Measure 37 waivers would not allow Oregon to expeditiously
implement its nonpoint source programs nor would it serve the ulti-
mate goal of restoring and maintaining the nation's waters. 285
In addition to the above legal rationales, several important policy
concerns justify a broad interpretation of the federal law exception
that includes land use regulations in state plans and programs subject
to federal approval. 286 First, as a practical matter, the strategies Ore-
gon presents to federal agencies are often, for all intents and pur-
poses, "required."287 For example, Oregon is free to allocate its TMDL
pollution budgets among pollution sources as it sees fit so long as the
sum of the allocations does not exceed the total pollution cap. 288 Nev-
ertheless, the state is much more likely to impose controls on pollu-
tion sources in close proximity to impaired waterbodies because such
controls will make a much greater contribution to achieving the pol-
lution goal than restrictions on sources many river miles away. 289 In
this way, the regulatory techniques chosen by Oregon's state and local
governments are often, in a practical sense, "required to comply with
federal law."2" In the case of the CWA, interpreting Measure 37's fed-
eral law exception narrowly would strip away the state's ability to en-
force the specific land use regulations that it now uses to achieve wa-
ter quality goals. 291 Oregon's nonpoint source control program would
almost certainly become more costly and less efficient because the
state would no longer be able to employ some of the most practical
and direct solutions to resolving federally defined problems. 292
Second, whereas a broad interpretation of Measure 37's federal
law exception that includes land use regulations in federally approved
plans and programs would secure important benefits for the state, a
narrow interpretation would mean risking that the relevant federal
agencies will use the "sticks" at their disposa1. 293 For example, under
the CWA, the EPA assesses Oregon's strategy for achieving water qual-
ity standards every time it reviews a Water Quality Management
295 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a), (a) (7); OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3) (C).
2" See infra notes 287-300 and accompanying text.
2'37 See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3)(C); EPA CWA INTRODUCTION, supra note 85, at 34.
2" See EPA CWA INTRODUCTION, supra note 85, at 34.
"a See id.
29° See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3) (C); EPA CWA INTRODUCTION, supra note 85, at 34.
291 See generally WILLAMETTE BASIN PLAN, supra note 83.
492 See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 289; Fischman, supra note 21, at 192-93.
293 See OR. Ray. STAT. § 197.352(3) (C); see, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(e) (2),
1329(h) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
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Plan.294 State plans are approved only if they represent "adequate im-
plementation, including schedules of compliance" to achieve water
quality standards.295 If the land use regulations that are included in
Oregon's Water Quality Management Plans were not exempt from
Measure 37 and became the subject of Measure 37 claims, the most
likely result would be the waiver of these regulations on a number of
individual properties. Such patchy enforcement would hardly con-
stitute "adequate implementation" and, by the terms of the CWA, the
EPA could revoke Oregon's point source permitting authority and
withhold federal funds. 297
Such federal overrides rarely occur in practice; however, Measure
37 presents a novel scenario and it is important to consider the possi-
ble consequences of a potentially extensive failure to enforce. 299 Ore-
gon could lose critical water pollution funding, and at least with re-
spect to point source permitting, the ability to employ its own
expertise and more sophisticated understanding of local condi-
tions. Ironically, a narrow interpretation of the federal law excep-
tion could lead to more regulation—precisely what property rights
advocates sought to curtail with Measure 37 in the first place.")
254 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e) (2); 40 C.F.R. § 130.5—.6 (2006).
2g43 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e) (3) (F).
to8 See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352 (8); DAS CLAIMS REGISTRY, supra note 10.
217/ See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e) (2), (3) (F) ("The Administrator shall not approve any state
permit program under title IV of this Act for any State which does not have any approved
continuing planning process under this section."); id. § 1329(h) (1), (5) (stating that "the
Administrator shall make grants [for nonpoint source control programs], subject to such
terms and conditions as the Administrator considers appropriate" including giving "prior-
ity for effective mechanisms").
"8 See id. §§ 1329(h), 1513(e)(2); PLATER ET AL., supra note 21, at 311; Kenneth M.
Murchison, Learning from More than Five-and-a-Half Decades of Federal Water Pollution Control
Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 527, 594-95 (2005).
The actual threat of revoking the state's funding and/or NPDES permitting authority may
be significantly weaker than the statute suggests. See PLATER ET AL., supra note 21, at 311
(noting the high fiscal and political costs of de-delegation); Murchison, supra, at 594-95
(noting that due to inadequate staffing and funding "EPA never has revoked a state's au-
thority to administer the [NPDES] program when a state has failed to perform its obliga-
tions").
2" See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(e) (2), 1329(h); Hodel, 452 U.S. at 289; Fischman, supra note
21, at 192-93.
800 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e) (2); BRADBURY, supra note 1, at 105-18.
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3. The Federal Law Exception Does Not Exempt State and Local Laws
That Exceed the Federal Floor
Perhaps the greatest difficulty with an interpretation of Measure
37's federal law exception that relies on federal approval is that Ore-
gon could in theory bootstrap any number of land use regulations
into its federally approved plans and programs." 1 Most cooperative
federalism statutes require state programs at least as stringent as fed-
eral standards but leave the door open for states to exceed federal
goals. 302 Thus, it is possible that Oregon's current plans and programs
under the CWA go beyond what is required to comply with federal
law. 303 Property rights advocates might further contend that in the
future, a broad interpretation of the federal law exception would al-
low the state to package additional regulations that are only tangen-
tially related to water quality into its Water Quality Management
Plans.304 So long as the Plans met the CWA's minimum standards, the
EPA would presumably approve them."3
This concern is mitigated at least to some degree by the language
of the federal law exception itself: a land use regulation is exempt from
Measure 37 "to the extent the land use regulation is required to comply
with federal law.” 306 Thus, the exception includes state regulations nec-
essary to meet the federal floor established by cooperative federalism
statutes, but not the state's efforts to reach for the ceiling." 7
In Columbia, the required federal baseline was easy to determine
because the minimum lot size regulations at issue were adopted by
901 See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3) (C); Oregonians in Action, supra note 81.
302 See Fischman, supra note 21, at 191; see, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1370(a) (1) (providing that
the CWA does not preclude states from adopting or enforcing any standard or limitation
with respect to water pollution unless such standard or limitation is less stringent than the
CWA).
565 See 33 U.S.C. § 1370(a) (1); OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3) (C).
"4 Oregonians in Action, supra note 81. The Oregonians in Action website contends:
Measure 37 does not apply to state and local land use regulations that are re-
quired to be adopted in order to comply with federal law. Some state and lo-
cal government officials may try to extend the reach of this exemption by
claiming that they are adopting land use regulations because the feds made
them do it.' But in most instances, the federal government leaves land use
planning and regulation to state and local governments, such that the times
when federal law truly mandates the adoption of a state or local land use law
are not common.
Id.
555 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e) (2); 40 C.F.R. §§ 130.5—.6 (2006).
"6 See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3) (C) (emphasis added).
707 See id.
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Hood River County directly from the Scenic Area Management Plan,
which was drafted by the Gorge Commission and the U.S. Forest Ser-
vice and approved by the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture. 308 Likewise, it
would have been easy to determine if Hood River County had gone
beyond what was required by the Scenic Area Act, for example, if the
county had applied a two-acre minimum lot size requirement to a
landowner's property where the Management Plan prescribed a one-
acre minimum.309
Under the CWA, there is no Management Plan against which to
measure state activity. 31° The EPA, however, provides substantial guid-
ance for state programs that might suggest what specific land use regula-
tions are "required."311 The agency may also condition the approval of
programmatic plans on certain modifications or on the presence of cer-
tain elements, thereby indicating required management strategies.su
Still, there may be cases where it is unclear whether specific land
use regulations are necessary for compliance or whether they exceed
the federal floor, especially given the EPA's (and the state's) compre-
hensive, basin wide approach to addressing water quality issues. 313 In
such cases, Oregon may have to request a determination from the
agency regarding what specific aspects of its CWA plans and programs
are "required to comply with federal law."14
CONCLUSION
Measure 37's federal law exception should be interpreted to in-
clude all land use regulations in federally approved plans and pro-
grams that represent Oregon's efforts to comply with federal law.
Admittedly, this is an expansive proposition. It is supported, however,
by the text of the federal law exception and by constitutional princi-
3°3 See Homo RIVER Conti -iv, OR., CODE art. 75 (2005); Columbia, 152 P.3d at 999, 1004;
SCENIC AREA MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 241; Commission's Brief, supra note 169, at
10.
® See OR, REV. STAT. § 197.352(3) (C); Hoon RIVER COUNTY, OR., CODE art. 75; SCE-
NIC AREA MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 241.
st° See 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 2001 & Supp. 2007).
311
 See 40 C.F.R. § 130 (2006); see, e.g., Grumbles Memorandum, supra note 277.
313 See 33 U.S.C. § 1329(d) (2); 40 C.F.R. § 130.5—.6.
313 See EPA CWA INTRODUCTION, supra note 85, at 31 ( -EPA is encouraging states,
tribes and territories to do TMDLs on a 'watershed basis' .... Ideally TMDLs would be
incorporated into comprehensive watershed strategies.... They would also address the
full array of activities affecting the waterbody."). See generally WILLAMETTE BASIN PLAN,
supra note 83.
314 See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352 (3) ( C) See generally 'WILLAMETTE BASIN PLAN, supra
note 83.
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pies that govern how Congress can and cannot compel state action. A
broad interpretation of the federal law exception is also buttressed by
key elements of cooperative federalism statutes that treat state pro-
grams as substitutes for federal regulation and rest the ultimate de-
termination regarding what constitutes compliance with federal agen-
cies. Perhaps most importantly, a broad interpretation of the federal
law exception makes sense. Such an interpretation allows Oregon to
maintain control over critical environmental programs and to imple-
ment cost-effective solutions that are tailored to the state's unique lo-
cal needs. These arguments are reinforced by Ballot Measure 49's
definition of federal law.
Evaluating the scope of Measure 37's federal law exception also
serves as a reminder that most environmental law, much of it implicat-
ing land use, is ultimately federal. This means that property rights ini-
tiatives such as Oregon's Measure 37 and Arizona's Proposition 207
cannot undermine state and local laws that are integral components
of a federal framework. Rather, these land use regulations should be
subject only to the long-established test of federal regulatory takings
law that considers both the fairness of land use regulations to individ-
ual property owners and the broader interests of the public.
REBECCA L. PUSKAS
